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E PLURIBUS UNUM?  THE FULL FAITH 
AND CREDIT CLAUSE AND MEANINGFUL 
RECOGNITION OF OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTIONS 
Pamela K. Terry* 
 
Parents and children whose legal relationships derive from state 
adoption judgments face uncertainty when they travel across state lines.  
State officials have denied out-of-state adoptive parents revised birth 
certificates, which recognize their status as legal parents in their child’s 
birth state, because the parents would be statutorily unable to adopt in that 
state. 
Various U.S. Courts of Appeals have disagreed as to whether, and to 
what extent, the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Article IV of the 
Constitution requires that state executive officials recognize out-of-state 
rights.  Circuits also differ as to whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
confers an individual right for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on parents 
alleging a violation of the Clause.  The divergent opinions result from 
conflicting interpretations of the force and scope of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, distinctions between recognition and enforcement of out-of-
state rights, and the varying views of the Clause’s balance of state policy 
interests and federal unity imperatives. 
This Note argues that the language, history, and purpose of the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause demonstrate that the Clause requires states—
including both judicial and executive officers—to give meaningful 
recognition to judicially established rights.  It concludes that the denial of 
revised birth certificates to out-of-state adoptive couples violates the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause’s mandate to meaningfully recognize and equally 
enforce out-of-state judgments. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................ 3095 
I.  BACKGROUND:  THE LEGAL ISSUES .................................................... 3097 
A.  The Full Faith and Credit Command:  
The Clause, Its History and Purpose .................................... 3097 
1.  Primer on a Problematic Clause ....................................... 3097 
2.  Origins and Interpretation ................................................ 3099 
 
*  J.D. Candidate, 2013, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 2006, Barnard College, 
Columbia University.  Many thanks to Professor Martin Flaherty for his guidance and 
insight, and to my sister Liz for suggesting this topic. 
3094 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
a.  The Law of Nations and English Full Faith and 
Credit ........................................................................ 3099 
b.  From Colonial Clauses to Constitution ..................... 3100 
c.  The Full Faith and Credit Statute .............................. 3102 
d.  The Supreme Court Resolves Credit Owed to 
Judgments ................................................................. 3103 
e.  The Clause and Choice of Law ................................... 3104 
3.  Purpose and Principles ..................................................... 3105 
4.  Modern Doctrine:  How to Measure Full Faith and 
Credit ............................................................................... 3107 
a.  Records and Routine Admission ................................. 3108 
b.  Public Acts and the Public Policy Exception ............. 3108 
c.  Judgments and the Distinction Between  
 Recognition and Enforcement................................... 3109 
5.  Enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause:   
 Thompson v. Thompson ................................................... 3110 
B.  The Twenty-First Century Brady Bunch:  
Adoption, Legal Parenthood, and Same-Sex Couples .......... 3112 
1.  The Requirement of Judicial Sanction ............................. 3112 
2.  Judicial Adoption Procedures and Determining  
 a Child‘s ―Best Interests‖ ................................................ 3113 
3.  State and Federal Laws Addressing Access  
 to Adoption for Gays and Lesbians ................................. 3115 
4.  The Adoption Decree, ―Incidental‖ Rights of Parent  
 and Child, and Birth Certificate Amendment Statutes .... 3117 
C.  The Beneficent Sword:  42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ―Other‖ 
Constitutional Clauses .......................................................... 3119 
1.  The Purpose and Scope of § 1983 .................................... 3119 
2.  Determining Constitutional Rights Within § 1983‘s 
Purview: Dennis v. Higgins ............................................. 3120 
II.  THE CONFLICT OVER RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT  
  OF OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTION DECREES:  WHOSE DUTY  
  IS IT AND WHAT IS ―EVENHANDED‖? .......................................... 3122 
A.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit .................... 3122 
1.  An Individual May Bring a Federal Cause of Action 
Against State Executive Officials for Alleged 
Violations of the Full Faith and Credit Clause ................ 3124 
2.  Reissuing a Birth Certificate Pursuant to State Law Is 
Within the Clause‘s Mandate .......................................... 3124 
B.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ...................... 3125 
1.  The Clause Does Not Govern the Actions of a State 
Executive Official and Does Not Create Individual 
Rights Actionable Under § 1983 ..................................... 3127 
2012] OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTIONS 3095 
2.  Issuing a Birth Certificate Is Enforcement of a 
Judgment, and Therefore Outside of the Clause‘s 
Mandate ........................................................................... 3129 
III.  CLASH OF POLICIES:  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT  
  OF OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTION DECREES UNDER THE FULL 
FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE ......................................................... 3130 
A.  Clarifying the Distinction Between Recognition  
 and Enforcement ................................................................... 3130 
B.  A State’s Binding Obligation Under the Clause  
 Confers an Individual Right to Equal Recognition  
 that Is Vindicable Under § 1983 ........................................... 3132 
1.  The Clause Imposes a Binding Obligation on States, 
Including State Executive Officials ................................ 3133 
2.  The Right to Meaningful Recognition of Adoption 
Is Sufficiently Specific for Federal Courts to Enforce .... 3134 
3.  The Framers Intended the Clause to Benefit Litigants 
by Ensuring Finality and Certainty ................................. 3134 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 3135 
INTRODUCTION 
It is when a clash of policies between two states emerges that the need of 
the Clause is the greatest.1 
In 2000, Heather Finstuen became a legal mother of two girls after 
adopting the biological daughters of her partner in New Jersey.2  The family 
moved to Oklahoma soon after the adoption.3  Beginning in 2004, however, 
Finstuen began to avoid signing her daughters‘ permission slips for school 
field trips, gymnastics, and Girl Scout camp.4  She stopped signing school 
enrollment forms and health release forms, even when one daughter had 
surgery.5  She and her partner, Anne Magro, feared that Finstuen would be 
unable to visit her daughters if one was admitted to intensive care, or be 
unable to sign forms in an emergency should Magro be unavailable.6 
The family‘s concern arose from a 2004 amendment to Oklahoma‘s 
adoption code that prohibited any state official, agency, or court from 
recognizing an out-of-state adoption by a same-sex couple.7  To Oklahoma 
officials, these out-of-state parent-child relationships did not exist.8  
Pursuant to the amendment, state officials began refusing to issue revised 
 
 1. United Nat‘l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38, 42 (1949). 
 2. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1302 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 
2007). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See id.; Brief for Appellees at 9, Finstuen, 496 F.3d 1139 (No. 06-6213), 2006 WL 
3381195. 
 5. Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 9. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See Finstuen, 497 F. Supp. 2d at 1300, 1302. 
 8. See Brief for the Appellees, supra note 4, at 9. 
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birth certificates for the children of same-sex couples who presented out-of-
state adoption decrees.9  Without these birth certificates, same-sex couples 
were unable to prove their parent-child relationships.10 
Once an obscure provision termed the ―lawyer‘s clause‖ of the 
Constitution,11 the Full Faith and Credit Clause is now at the center of a 
nationwide debate involving parents, children, adoption, and same-sex 
marriage.12  Circuit courts have split regarding the force and scope of the 
Clause.  In Finstuen v. Crutcher,13 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit held that the Oklahoma adoption code amendment violated the 
Clause by categorically prohibiting recognition of out-of-state adoption 
decrees held by same-sex couples.14  In so holding, the Tenth Circuit 
allowed the plaintiffs to bring a federal action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
the deprivation of constitutional rights by a state executive official.15 
Five years later, in Adar v. Smith,16 the Fifth Circuit held that a Louisiana 
policy of denying revised birth certificates to same-sex out-of-state couples 
did not violate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.17  The Fifth Circuit also 
held that the Clause governed only state courts, rather than state officials, 
and that plaintiffs had no federal cause of action under § 1983 for alleged 
violations of the Clause.18  This circuit split reflects the current climate in 
the United States of ―volatile uncertainty regarding the portability of 
parental rights acquired by same-sex or unmarried couples and other 
alternative families from state to state.‖19 
This Note explains the legal conflict surrounding a state‘s obligation 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize out-of-state adoption 
judgments held by certain groups or individuals, and whether that 
obligation confers an individual right enforceable under § 1983.  Part I of 
this Note explores the command of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the 
policies and law underlying American adoption practice, and the protection 
of constitutional rights under § 1983.  Part II analyzes the split among 
courts over whether out-of-state adoptive couples are entitled to receive 
revised birth certificates recognizing their status as legal parents in their 
child‘s birth state, when the couple would be unable to adopt in that state.  
 
 9. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1146–47 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 10. Id. at 1145. 
 11. Robert H. Jackson, Full Faith and Credit—The Lawyer’s Clause of the Constitution, 
45 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2 (1945). 
 12. See, e.g., Laurie Goodstein, Illinois Bishops Drop Program over Bias Rule, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at A16 (discussing a controversy regarding a new Illinois law 
requiring Catholic Charities to consider same-sex couples as potential adoptive parents in 
order to receive state funding); Mark Landler, Obama Still Lets Surrogates Take the Lead as 
Gay Rights Momentum Builds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011, at A11. 
 13. 496 F.3d 1139. 
 14. Id. at 1156. 
 15. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 2, Finstuen v. Edmondson, 
497 F. Supp. 2d 1295 (W.D. Okla. 2006) (No. 04CV1152), 2004 WL 3139176. 
 16. 639 F.3d 146 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011). 
 17. Id. at 160. 
 18. Id. at 156–57. 
 19. 1 KAREN MOUDLING, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW § 1:26 (West 2012). 
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In Part III, this Note proposes a framework of ―meaningful recognition‖ to 
describe the Clause‘s mandate concerning judicially established rights.  It 
asserts that this obligation binds both state judicial and executive officers.  
The Note concludes that the denial of revised birth certificates to out-of-
state adoptive couples violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s command 
to meaningfully recognize and equally enforce out-of-state judgments. 
I.  BACKGROUND:  THE LEGAL ISSUES 
This Note first explores the three legal fields that have converged in the 
current circuit split.  Part I.A explains how the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
requires states to recognize—to varying degrees—legal rights and 
obligations created in sister states.  Part I.B describes state adoption practice 
with a focus on same-sex couples‘ access to adoption.  Part I.C considers 
the vindication of constitutional rights under § 1983. 
A.  The Full Faith and Credit Command:  
The Clause, Its History and Purpose 
This section examines how the knotty doctrine of full faith and credit 
regulates interstate relations and protects rights and obligations that travel 
across state lines.  Part I.A.1 introduces the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
and the fundamental issues surrounding its application.  Part I.A.2 details 
the development of the full faith and credit doctrine, as advanced by the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  After explaining the principles animating the Clause 
in Part I.A.3, Part I.A.4 shows how the Clause‘s underlying principles 
determine the different credit due to state records, laws, and judgments.  
Part I.A.5 concludes by describing Supreme Court precedent that has 
addressed the scope of the Clause. 
1.  Primer on a Problematic Clause 
Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution commands that ―Full Faith and 
Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial 
Proceedings of every other State.  And the Congress may by general Laws 
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be 
proved, and the Effect thereof.‖20  At its core, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause addresses what a state should do when presented with a sister-state 
law or judgment.  In doing so, it ―serves to coordinate the administration of 
justice among the several independent legal systems which exist in our 
Federation.‖21 
 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  The second sentence of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 
sometimes referred to as the ―Effects Clause.‖ See Ralph U. Whitten, The Original 
Understanding of the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act, 32 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 255, 257 (1998).  For clarity, this Note will refer to the first sentence as 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and to the second sentence as the Effects Clause. 
 21. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 2. 
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It is uncontested that the terms ―faith‖ and ―credit‖ derive from the 
English law of evidence22 and that the doctrine generally developed from 
the law of nations.23  It is also clear that the Clause does not mean that one 
state‘s judgment holds the same force in a second state as a judgment 
rendered by that second state.24  The Supreme Court has acknowledged that 
literal enforcement of the Clause can lead to ―absurd‖ results.25  Thus, 
despite its modifier ―full,‖ the Full Faith and Credit Clause is neither 
―inexorable [nor] unqualified‖ in its application to records, statutes, and 
judgments.26  Scholars have asserted that ―murky‖27 origins and a ―hazy‖28 
understanding of this constitutional clause have contributed to its 
problematic interpretation. 
A fundamental uncertainty has been how to weigh the full faith and 
credit due to the various sister-state activities listed in the Clause.  Since the 
Clause‘s enactment, scholars have debated whether it provides for a narrow, 
evidentiary effect, or a broader, preclusive effect.29  Under the narrow 
evidentiary approach, out-of-state enactments would be given effect only 
insofar as a court must accept them as proof that another state‘s statutes and 
judgments exist and ―deal with the matters described in their text.‖30  Their 
content could then be impeached or challenged.31 
Interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause to contain a broader 
provision would demand that states give substantive effect to sister-state 
laws and judgments.32  For example, a judgment‘s merits—not just its 
existence—would be given conclusive effect so as to preclude a second 
state from examining the same issues of the judgment.33  This approach 
would oblige states to recognize the rights and obligations created by a 
 
 22. See infra note 44. 
 23. See infra note 41. 
 24. See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945) (asserting that the 
Framers rejected such a proposal at the 1787 Constitutional Convention). 
 25. Alaska Packers Ass‘n v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).  For a 
discussion on how the Clause has been interpreted to avoid such a result, see infra Part 
I.A.2.e. 
 26. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941). 
 27. WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN, THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT 
CLAUSE:  A REFERENCE GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 1 (2005). 
 28. Jackson, supra note 11, at 6. 
 29. Compare Whitten, supra note 20, at 294 (―[F]rom English law through the 
ratification of the Constitution, the evidence is compelling that the first 
sentence . . . [contained commands] merely to admit [judgments of other states] into 
evidence as ‗full‘ proof of their own existence and contents . . . .‖), with REYNOLDS & 
RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 6–7 (describing the Clause at the time of ratification as ―giving 
the judgments of each state preclusive effect‖), and Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of 
Equal and Territorial States:  The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. 
L. REV. 249, 290 (1992) (asserting that ―the Full Faith and Credit Clause has always been 
understood‖ to mean that ―[i]f the first court had jurisdiction, its judgment is binding on all 
other states‖). 
 30. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 257, 263–64. 
 31. Id. at 263–64. 
 32. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13. 
 33. See id. 
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sister-state‘s judgment.34  Such a firm mandate would also, in theory, 
require states to substitute another state‘s statutory or common law for their 
own when the two laws conflict.35  And yet, such a requirement would be, 
in the Supreme Court‘s language, ―absurd.‖36 
Defining the substantive effect entitled to a sister-state‘s laws 
complicated the Clause‘s earliest interpretation.37  A group of scholars has 
recently asserted that the modern full faith and credit doctrine has 
significantly diverged from what the Framers intended.38  The sections 
below provide further detail on the administration of full faith and credit. 
2.  Origins and Interpretation 
This section discusses the origins of the full faith and credit doctrine and 
the judicial development of the American approach to full faith and credit.  
It considers how the same command came to require different levels of 
credit for laws and judgments.  This section also explains how both the 
absence of codified choice-of-law rules to address conflicting state laws,39 
and the addition of a federal full faith and credit implementing statute,40 led 
to initial uncertainty over the extent of a state‘s obligation under the Clause 
to give effect to out-of-state laws and judgments. 
a.  The Law of Nations and English Full Faith and Credit 
The full faith and credit doctrine speaks to situations in which a state is 
presented with a ―foreign‖ (out-of-state) law or judgment.  The doctrine has 
its origins in principles of the law of nations.41  Generally, the laws of one 
 
 34. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). 
 35. See Alaska Packers Ass‘n v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935). 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 345 (asserting that judges interpreting the full faith 
and credit command between 1790 and 1813 considered its application to public acts to be 
―a large obstacle to a broad interpretation . . . of the Clause‖); infra Part I.A.2. 
 38. See, e.g., David E. Engdahl, The Classic Rule of Faith and Credit, 118 YALE L.J. 
1584, 1586–92 (2009) (arguing that the classic full faith and credit rule, concerning 
evidentiary sufficiency, has been obscured and forgotten because of judicial error and 
insufficient critical commentary); Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early 
Congress, 95 VA. L. REV. 1201, 1278–79 (2009) (contending that the Clause contained only 
an evidentiary framework, and that ―[o]ver the past 200 years, courts have made ever more 
of the spirit of the Clause and of its implementing statute, but in doing so they have rendered 
the doctrine less and less coherent‖); Whitten, supra note 20, at 257 (―[M]odern Supreme 
Court decisions have . . . gone far beyond the original understanding of the 
provision . . . [and] there is little chance that the Supreme Court will revise its current 
interpretation of the Clause to return to the original meaning . . . .‖). 
 39. See infra Part I.A.2.e. 
 40. See infra Part I.A.2.c. 
 41. See, e.g., Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 723–24 n.1 (1988) (observing that 
the original content of the Full Faith and Credit Clause was ―properly derived from 
[international conflicts law]‖); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE 
J. INT‘L L. 1, 51–55 (2006) (drawing on nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century full 
faith and credit cases to conclude that the Supreme Court has turned to international law as a 
source of authority when interpreting the Full Faith and Credit Clause). But see infra notes 
42, 91–93 and accompanying text for examples of how the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
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nation are not binding in the territory of another nation; thus, any effect 
given to foreign laws and judgments is a gesture of comity.42  Accordingly, 
nations treat foreign judgments only as prima facie evidence of the 
underlying claim, the merits of which could be reexamined by the second 
nation.43 
Scholars agree that the Constitution‘s phrase ―full faith and credit‖ 
derives from the English law of evidence.44  The term‘s usage by English 
courts, however, was ―ambiguous‖45 or, more positively, ―highly 
flexible.‖46  To accord full faith and credit could mean authenticating an 
affidavit,47 deeming a record trustworthy,48 or giving prior proceedings 
preclusive effect.49  Significantly, English courts treated prior domestic 
records and foreign records differently.50  By the eighteenth century, 
foreign judgments were given only evidentiary credit, while domestic 
judgments from different courts could be entitled to substantive credit 
depending on the type or authority of the rendering court.51 
b.  From Colonial Clauses to Constitution 
For the colonies, the two-fold English treatment raised the question of 
whether sister-colony judgments should be treated as foreign or domestic.52  
Eighteenth century colonial laws varied between granting evidentiary or 
substantive effect to neighboring colonies‘ judgments or records.53  Thus, 
the drafters of the Articles of Confederation in 1777 faced a diversity of 
approaches to full faith and credit.54 
 
differs from the law-of-nations approach.  The law of nations is a set of natural law rules that 
governs peacetime relations among nations, and addresses traditionally domestic legal issues 
such as contract, property, tort, and crime. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*66–68. 
 42. See Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (distinguishing the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause from the ―general principle of international law by which local policy [was] 
permitted to dominate rules of comity‖).  Comity, one nation‘s recognition of another 
nation‘s legislative, executive, or judicial acts, is ―neither a matter of absolute [legal] 
obligation . . . nor of mere courtesy and good will‖ but derives from a nation‘s regard to 
―international duty and convenience‖ and ―to the rights of . . . persons who are under the 
protection of its laws.‖ Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895). 
 43. See Hilton, 159 U.S. at 181. 
 44. See, e.g., Sachs, supra note 38, at 1217–19; Whitten, supra note 20, at 269–73.  
While one scholar has suggested that the Clause‘s term ―faith‖ implies ―good faith,‖ another 
has dismissed this interpretation and argued that the historical evidence ―indicates that it was 
understood to mean ‗trust.‘‖ Compare Laycock, supra note 29, at 296, with Whitten, supra 
note 20, at 351. 
 45. Sachs, supra note 38, at 1218. 
 46. Whitten, supra note 20, at 267. 
 47. Sachs, supra note 38, at 1218–19. 
 48. Id. at 1219. 
 49. Whitten, supra note 20, at 267. 
 50. Id. at 269–71. 
 51. Engdahl, supra 38, at 1599–1600; Sachs, supra note 38, at 1219. 
 52. Engdahl, supra 38, at 1607; Whitten, supra note 20, at 271. 
 53. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 274–80 (describing full faith and credit acts from 
Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, and South Carolina). 
 54. Sachs, supra note 38, at 1223; Whitten, supra note 20, at 281. 
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The Articles of Confederation contained a full faith and credit clause 
identical to that in the Constitution but did not contain an Effects Clause.55  
The five reported cases decided under the Articles‘ full faith and credit 
provision suggest an evidentiary approach but do not constitute conclusive 
evidence about how early courts understood the force of full faith and 
credit.56  The cases indicate that courts were concerned about defining 
what, if any, substantive effect was entitled to sister-state judgments and 
laws.57 
The Constitutional Convention of 1787 retained the Articles‘ full faith 
and credit command but added the Effects Clause58 in response to 
objections that ―if the Legislature were not allowed to declare the effect the 
provision would amount to nothing more than what now takes place among 
all Independent Nations.‖59  The Effects Clause allows Congress to provide 
the manner of authentication and declare the effect of state public acts, 
records, and judicial proceedings.60  The draft text, however, granted 
discretion to the states on whether to accord faith and credit, and mandated 
the federal government to prescribe the interstate effects of judgments.61  
The Convention eventually adopted James Madison‘s suggestion to switch 
the verbs ―ought‖ and ―shall‖ so that the Clause‘s charge was binding on 
states and the power to promulgate effects of the Clause was within 
Congress‘s discretion.62  Consequently, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
 
 55. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV,  para. 3 (―Full faith and credit shall be 
given in each of these States to records, acts and judicial proceedings of the courts and 
magistrates of every other State.‖).  No surviving document describes how the clause came 
to be included in the Articles. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1607. 
 56. Compare Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1618 (asserting that, taken together, the 
decisions indicate that courts gave evidentiary, but not binding, effect to sister-state 
judgments), with Kurt H. Nadelmann, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts:  
A Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MICH. L. REV. 33, 53 (1957) (―These few decisions 
are insufficient to support any specific construction of the Full Faith and Credit clause in the 
Articles.‖).  James Madison described the Articles‘ provision as ―extremely indeterminate‖ 
and ―of little importance under any interpretation which it will bear.‖ THE FEDERALIST NO. 
42, at 221 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). 
 57. See Engdahl, supra 38, at 1614–19 (describing cases); Whitten, supra note 20, at 
281–88 (same). 
 58. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 59. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 488 (Max Farrand ed., 1986) 
(quoting James Wilson); see Whitten, supra note 20, at 376. 
 60. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 5–6. 
 61. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 564–65 (1937). 
 62. See 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 59, at 489; Daniel 
A. Crane, The Original Understanding of the ―Effects Clause‖ of Article IV, Section 1 and 
Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 307, 323 (1998).  
Madison praised the final constitutional provision as ―an evident and valuable improvement‖ 
over the Articles of Confederation, and described Congress‘s Effects Clause power as ―a 
very convenient instrument of justice.‖ See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 56, at 221–
22 (James Madison). 
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became mandatory for states,63 while the Effects Clause permitted the 
federal government to modify states‘ compliance at its discretion.64 
c.  The Full Faith and Credit Statute 
Congress soon exercised its Effects Clause power by passing a full faith 
and credit act in 1790 (Full Faith and Credit Act).65  In addition to 
prescribing specific modes of authentication, the Act required that ―records 
and judicial proceedings . . . shall have such faith and credit given to them 
in every court within the United States, as they have by law or usage in the 
courts of the state from whence the said records are or shall be taken.‖66  
Because the Act varied from the Clause in scope67 but echoed the Clause‘s 
 
 63. In other words, the Clause, its effect notwithstanding, was self-executing. See, e.g., 
Laycock, supra note 29, at 292; Sachs, supra note 38, at 1229. 
 64. See Crane, supra note 62, at 315, 323.  The passage of the Defense of Marriage Act, 
1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), ignited vigorous debate over the extent of 
congressional power under the Effects Clause; this Note can only briefly summarize the 
controversy in the context of full faith and credit.  According to one theory, Congress can 
constitutionally legislate to augment the faith and credit mandate but cannot authorize 
anything less than ―full‖ faith and credit. See, e.g., Paige E. Chabora, Congress’ Power 
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. 
L. REV. 604, 635–39 (1997) (comparing this ―Ratchet Theory‖ to the one-way ratchet theory 
considered in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1970), in which the Supreme Court 
suggested that Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment allowed Congress to strengthen 
but not narrow Fourteenth Amendment rights); James M. Patten, The Defense of Marriage 
Act:  How Congress Said ―No‖ to Full Faith and Credit and the Constitution, 38 SANTA 
CLARA L. REV. 939, 952–57 (1998) (arguing that Congress has no power to enact legislation 
that limits the effect of the Full Faith and Credit Clause because such legislation reduces the 
Clause to ―surplusage‖); Joseph William Singer, Same Sex Marriage, Full Faith and Credit, 
and the Evasion of Obligation, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 44 (2005) (contending that to 
decrease the required effect of state statutes and judgments would ―repeal part of the 
Constitution‖).  The opposing theory asserts that the Effects Clause permits Congress to 
excuse recognition of out-of-state marriage, thus contracting the full faith and credit 
command. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-664, at 26–27 (1996), reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2930–31 (―Congress retains a discretionary power to carve out such 
exceptions as it deems appropriate.‖); Lynn D. Wardle, Non-recognition of Same-Sex 
Marriage Judgments Under DOMA and the Constitution, 38 CREIGHTON L. REV. 365, 391–
419 (2005) (arguing that the Effects Clause grants qualified power to Congress to prescribe 
the effect of sister-state activities because it is the ―branch of government best suited to make 
the decision about conflicting state policy interests‖).  The Supreme Court has not ruled on 
this matter, but once observed: 
[W]hile Congress clearly has the power to increase the measure of faith and credit 
that a State must accord to the laws or judgments of another State, there is at least 
some question whether Congress may cut back on the measure of faith and credit 
required by a decision of this Court. 
Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272 n.18 (1980). 
 65. See Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738 (2006)).  This act is often called the ―implementing statute.‖ E.g., Baker v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 235 (1998); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Civil Judgments:  A Summary View of the Situation in the United 
States, 4 INT‘L LAW. 720, 722 n.10 (1970). 
 66. Act of May 26, 1790, ch. 11. 
 67. The Act‘s language varies from the Clause‘s text in several ways.  First, the Act is 
silent as to the interstate effect of laws (public acts).  Second, whereas the Clause mandates 
that full faith and credit be given ―in each State,‖ the Act limits its prescribed effect to 
courts.  Third, the Act also limits its scope to judicial records.  Fourth, the Act extends the 
2012] OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTIONS 3103 
faith and credit language, judges interpreting the Act were required to 
address whether Congress was importing the Clause‘s command or 
dictating a different effect.68  As with the faith and credit provision in the 
Articles of Confederation, the lower court decisions included both 
evidentiary and substantive interpretations of the term ―full faith and 
credit.‖69  A second implementing statute, enacted in 1804 to cover 
executive records,70 did little to resolve the uncertainty.71  Eventually, the 
Supreme Court addressed the divergent interpretations in its first full faith 
and credit case in 1813. 
d.  The Supreme Court Resolves Credit Owed to Judgments 
In Mills v. Duryee,72 the Supreme Court ruled that the Full Faith and 
Credit Act prescribed a substantive effect for records and judgments so as 
to preclude the reexamination of merits.73  Mills concerned an action of 
debt brought in the District of Columbia on a New York judgment, and 
addressed the question whether the defendant could enter a plea denying the 
existence of the debt.74  The Supreme Court, therefore, had to resolve 
whether the prior New York judgment should be introduced into the D.C. 
court as merely rebuttable evidence of debt, or given substantive effect.75 
Writing for the majority, Justice Joseph Story explained that interpreting 
the Act to contain a mere evidentiary rule would render the constitutional 
Clause ―illusory.‖76  Mills clarified that the judgment of a state court must 
have the same ―credit, validity and effect‖ in other states as it had in the 
 
faith and credit obligation to all courts, thus including federal courts.  Fifth, though using the 
Clause‘s phrase ―faith and credit,‖ the Act does not specify ―full faith and credit‖ but 
employs the comparative expression ―such faith and credit . . . as‖ the record or judgment 
had where rendered.  The current statute, as amended in 1948, requires full faith and credit to 
sister-state statutes, and expands its coverage to federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006) 
(―Such Acts, records and judicial proceedings or copies thereof, so authenticated, shall have 
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and 
Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State, Territory or Possession 
from which they are taken.‖). 
 68. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1588, 1640–47 (surveying cases and arguing that the 
Clause contained an evidentiary sufficiency rule and the Act prescribed substantive effect); 
Whitten, supra note 20, at 296–327 (analyzing cases and concluding that a ―clear majority‖ 
of judges rejected a broad reading of both the Clause and Act). 
 69. See Engdahl, supra note 38, at 1640–47; Whitten, supra note 20, at 296–327; supra 
notes 56–57 and accompanying text. 
 70. See Act of Mar. 27, 1804, ch. 11, 2 Stat. 298 (recodified as 28 U.S.C. § 1739 (2006)) 
(providing all ―records [once authenticated] . . . shall have the same full faith and credit in 
every court and office within the United States . . . as they have . . . in the courts or offices of 
the State . . . from which they are taken.‖). 
 71. See Sachs, supra note 38, at 1246–48. 
 72. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 481 (1813). 
 73. Id. at 483. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 484. 
 76. Id. at 485.  Reynolds and Richman note that Justice Story‘s ―emphatic rejection‖ of 
an evidentiary interpretation of the Act was ―heightened‖ by the fact that it was issued over a 
dissent, ―a rare event in those days.‖ REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 9. 
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rendering state.77  In Mills, therefore, the substance of the prior New York 
judgment could not be revisited or impeached in a second state.78  Justice 
Story attributed the substantive effect to the Act and did not directly address 
the Clause‘s force.79  
Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, the effect given to 
sister-state judgments was attributed to both the Clause and Act without 
regard to the provisions‘ differing language.80  Thus, in 1887‘s Chicago & 
Alton Railroad Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co.,81 the Supreme Court stated in 
dicta that ―[w]ithout doubt‖ the Clause by itself meant that even statutes 
―shall be given the same effect by the courts of another state that they have 
by law and usage at home.‖82 
e.  The Clause and Choice of Law 
As noted above, the Full Faith and Credit Clause generally governs the 
force with which a state judgment or law travels across state lines.83  The 
Clause does not, however, specify what happens where one state court is 
faced with another state‘s conflicting statutory or common law.84  The 
Clause‘s silence as to choice-of-law rules has been a thorny issue in full 
faith and credit doctrine for state legislative acts.85  This Note briefly 
summarizes the issue. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court experimented 
with and abandoned an application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that 
involved appraising states‘ competing interests to determine which state law 
to apply in a dispute.86  Under this balancing approach, ―[p]rima facie every 
state [was] entitled to enforce in its own courts its own statutes,‖ unless one 
of the parties showed ―that of the conflicting interests involved those of the 
foreign state [were] superior to those of the forum.‖87  This method 
 
 77. See Hampton v. McConnel, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234, 234 (1818) (summarizing 
Mills‘s holding). 
 78. Mills, 11 U.S. at 483. 
 79. Id. at 485. 
 80. See Engdahl, supra  note 38, at 1588 (―By the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century . . . habituation to the longstanding replication rule prescribed by the 1790 Act had 
induced the impression that [the Clause‘s phrase ―full faith and credit‖] by itself imported 
sister-state replication of effect [for judgments from other forums].‖). 
 81. 119 U.S. 615 (1887). 
 82. Id. at 622. 
 83. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 84. For a summary of modern full faith and credit doctrine regarding state laws, see 
infra Part I.A.4.b. 
 85. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 19–43 (providing an overview of 
the ―public acts‖ provision‘s ―long and checkered history‖); Jackson, supra note 11, at 6–7 
(concluding that the Framers did not ―anticipate the refinements and distinctions that have 
been developed by later experience and now find place in that peculiarly American body of 
scholarship and controversy known as ‗Conflict of Laws‘‖). 
 86. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 495 (2003) (describing this line of 
cases). 
 87. Alaska Packers Ass‘n v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 294 U.S. 532, 547–48 (1935). 
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suggested that a state would not have to apply sister-state law that it found 
―obnoxious to its policy.‖88 
Having discarded this balancing approach, the Supreme Court‘s 
application of full faith and credit now allows a state to choose its own law 
as long as it ―ha[s] a significant contact or significant aggregation of 
contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither 
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.‖89  In this way, the evolving application 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause to statutes has merged with the Due 
Process Clause to impose a minimal constitutional limit on a state‘s choice 
of law in its courts.90 
3.  Purpose and Principles 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is an essential tool for welding the 
states into a unified and integrated country.91  The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly declared that the Clause‘s animating purpose was ―to alter the 
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to 
ignore obligations created under the laws or by the judicial proceedings of 
the others, and to make them integral parts of a single nation.‖92  To 
achieve the change from foreign sovereigns to united states, the Framers 
―substituted [the Clause‘s] command for the earlier principles of comity.‖93  
As a result, the Full Faith and Credit Clause prevents states from 
discriminating against other states and refusing to enforce validly created 
rights and obligations.94 
When the Clause restricts one state‘s authority, however, it concurrently 
promotes state sovereignty by preserving the policies encompassed in 
 
 88. Pac. Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 504 (1939).  For 
discussion on the ―public policy‖ exception to full faith and credit due to statutes, see infra 
notes 121–25 and accompanying text. 
 89. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981). 
 90. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 19. 
 91. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wash. Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 289 (1980) (White, J., 
concurring) (―[T]he major purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause is to act as a 
nationally unifying force.‖); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951) (―[T]he 
Framers intended [the Clause] to help weld the independent states into a nation . . . .‖); 
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943) (describing the Clause as ―a 
nationally unifying force‖ similar to the Commerce Clause). 
 92. Milwaukee Cnty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276–77 (1935); see, e.g., Baker 
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998); Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 n.9 
(1951); Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942). 
 93. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).  For a definition of comity, see supra note 
42. 
 94. See Hughes, 341 U.S. at 611 (―It is also settled that [a state] cannot escape [its] 
constitutional obligation to enforce the rights and duties validly created under the laws of 
other states by the simple device of removing jurisdiction from courts otherwise 
competent.‖); Estin, 334 U.S. at 546–47 (―The Full Faith and Credit Clause is not to be 
applied, accordion-like, to accommodate [a court‘s] personal predilections.‖); Milwaukee 
Cnty., 296 U.S. at 276–77 (interpreting the Clause to prevent states from ignoring legal 
obligations created by other states); cf. Haywood v. Drown, 129 S. Ct. 2108, 2125–26 n.5 
(2009) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Clause is a ―textual prohibition‖ on ―state-
to-state discrimination‖). 
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another state‘s judicial determination, law, or record.95  The Supreme Court 
has observed that the Clause prevents ―parochial entrenchment on the 
interests of other States‖ that would occur if the rendering state could 
dictate an external effect other than full faith and credit.96  The Clause 
promotes interstate compromise by allowing a state to determine the 
extraterritorial effects of its laws, but only ―indirectly, by prescribing the 
effect of its judgments within‖ its own territory.97 
In addition to balancing state interests in securing and defending policies, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges states to respect judicial finality.98  
The Clause limits a state legislature‘s ability to undermine the enforcement 
of obligations created by sister-state judiciaries.99  Similarly, the Clause 
prohibits state executive officers from substituting their judgment for the 
policies underlying a sister-state‘s judicial determination.100  Though the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause allows state legislatures to direct the 
enforcement of rights and obligations resulting from out-of-state judgments, 
the Clause ensures that states treat the judgments with equal dignity, 
regardless of the conflicting policies.101 
The Supreme Court has also articulated that the Clause benefits 
individual litigants by preserving their rights acquired or confirmed under a 
state‘s validly created law or judgment.102  The Clause advances the 
―maximum enforcement‖ of state obligations or rights in sister-states.103  
 
 95. See Jackson, supra note 11, at 34 (asserting that the Clause promotes a system of 
justice ―based on the preservation but better integration‖ of state jurisdictions); Mark D. 
Rosen, Why the Defense of Marriage Act Is Not (Yet?) Unconstitutional:  Lawrence, Full 
Faith and Credit, and the Many Societal Actors that Determine What the Constitution 
Requires, 90 MINN. L. REV. 915, 935 (2006) (―Case law makes clear . . . that the Clause aims 
not only at unifying the states, but also at ensuring that the states remain meaningfully 
empowered, distinct polities.‖). 
 96. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 272. 
 97. Id. at 270; cf. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 10 (asserting that the Clause 
minimizes interstate friction). 
 98. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996) (stating that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause requires a state to ―treat a state-court judgment with the same 
respect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering State‖); REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, 
supra note 27, at 10 (asserting that the Clause requires states to ―trust the integrity of the 
activities of other states‖). 
 99. See Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139, 1156 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that an 
Oklahoma statute that categorically denied the ―effective operation‖ of a class of sister-state 
judgments violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause); infra Part II.A.2. 
 100. See Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (Va. 2005) (invalidating a state 
registrar‘s interpretation of a statute providing for the recognition of out-of-state adoption 
decrees to exclude adoptions by same-sex couples because ―[j]ust as we cannot substitute 
our judgment for that of the [Virginia] General Assembly, neither can an agency of the 
executive branch of government‖). But see Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 160 (5th Cir.) (en 
banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011) (upholding a state registrar‘s interpretation of a 
statute directing the recognition of out-of-state adoption decrees to exclude adoptions by 
same-sex couples without addressing the registrar‘s power to do so). 
 101. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (explaining that a state‘s 
obligation to recognize sister-state judgments is ―exacting‖ and lacks any ―public policy 
exception‖). 
 102. See, e.g., Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941); Pac. 
Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939). 
 103. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 612 (1951). 
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By preserving the finality of judgments, the Clause protects individual 
liberty and allows individuals to travel through states with the security that 
judicially created rights enjoy ―nation-wide application.‖104  Moreover, a 
state‘s full faith and credit duty promotes finality and certainty for 
individuals by preventing dissatisfied litigants from relitigating issues that 
have already been decided in another state.105  The Clause protects parties 
from the ―uncertainty, confusion, and delay‖ that accompany such 
reexamination.106 
In sum, the Full Faith and Credit Clause carefully balances four 
competing interests:  (1) the interest of federalism in state compromise; (2) 
dual state interests in promoting state policies and defending against the 
intrusion of other state‘s policies; (3) the interest of separation of powers in 
preserving judgments; and (4) the interests of individuals in liberty and 
security.107  The different credit due to sister-state laws or judgments 
reflects the Clause‘s cautious balance.108  Scholars debate when the Clause 
may recognize that a single state‘s interest in preserving its own policies— 
and declining the policies encompassed by an out-of-state judgment—is 
outweighed by the competing federal, state, and individual interests.109  In 
such cases, the Clause may ―order submission by one State even to hostile 
policies reflected in the judgment of another State, because the practical 
operation of the federal system . . . demand[s] it.‖110  Thus, a state‘s full 
faith and credit obligation is the ―price‖ of a unified federal system.111 
4.  Modern Doctrine:  How to Measure Full Faith and Credit 
In effecting the principles discussed above, contemporary Supreme Court 
decisions have clarified that the demand of full faith and credit adjusts 
depending on the type of law rendered.  Building on the history and 
principles outlined above, this section details the modern doctrine of full 
faith and credit. 
 
 104. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943); see Courtney G. Joslin, 
Travel Insurance:  Protecting Lesbian and Gay Parent Families Across State Lines, 4 HARV. 
L. & POL‘Y REV. 31, 39–40 (2010). 
 105. See Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604, 611 (1958). 
 106. Underwriters Nat‘l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guar. 
Ass‘n, 455 U.S. 691, 704 (1982). 
 107. See Rhonda Wasserman, Are You Still My Mother?  Interstate Recognition of 
Adoptions by Gays and Lesbians, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2008) (identifying the tension 
between family, state, and federal interests). 
 108. See infra Part I.A.4.b–c. 
 109. Compare Wasserman, supra note 107, at 82 (concluding that state, federal, and— 
especially in the adoption context—a child‘s ―overriding interest in stable family 
relationships,‖ outweigh a single state‘s interest in denying recognition or enforcement to 
out-of-state adoption decrees), with Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Interstate 
Recognition of Lesbigay Adoptions, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 561, 598–99 (2005) (concluding 
that a state may decline to recognize or enforce incidental rights of sister-state adoption 
judgments that violate a strong, conflicting policy of the state). 
 110. Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948). 
 111. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948) (―If in [the Clause‘s] application 
local policy must at times be required to give way, such ‗is the part of the price of our federal 
system.‘‖ (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942))). 
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a.  Records and Routine Admission 
Case law and commentary are sparse on the full faith and credit 
doctrine‘s application to records.112  ―Records‖ in the Clause refer to 
nonjudicial records.113  The two implementing statutes provide simple 
procedures for authenticating records for admission into evidence,114 which 
courts have followed without controversy.115  The ―records‖ provisions of 
the Clause and its companion acts have not been applied beyond this 
effect.116  Generally, to give full faith and credit to sister-state records 
means to ―admit them routinely‖ into evidence in court.117 
b.  Public Acts and the Public Policy Exception 
A state‘s compliance with the full faith and credit command when asked 
to apply another state‘s ―public acts‖ is more complex.118  It is well 
established that a state‘s statutes constitute ―public acts‖ under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.119  For choice-of-law purposes, the Supreme Court 
has articulated that the Clause operates along with the Due Process Clause 
to impose a minimal constitutional limit on a forum state‘s authority to 
apply its own law in a dispute between diverse parties.120 
With an accommodating standard,121 the Clause does not require ―a state 
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a 
subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.‖122  Although 
by the 1950s the Supreme Court had abandoned the notion that a court 
should weigh conflicting state interests,123 it has reiterated that a court may 
be ―guided by the forum State‘s ‗public policy‘ in determining the law 
applicable to a controversy.‖124  As recently as 2003, the Supreme Court 
 
 112. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13–18. 
 113. See Whitten, supra note 20, at 294. 
 114. See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
 115. See REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13–14 (observing that the ―absence of 
controversy‖ about the application of full faith and credit to records ―reveals how well the 
system [for records] works in practice‖). 
 116. See id. at 13–18. But see Shawn Gebhardt, Comment, Full Faith and Credit for 
Status Records:  A Reconsideration of Gardiner, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1419, 1422–25 (2009) 
(arguing that personal status records issued by administrative agencies should be accorded 
the same faith and credit as judgments). 
 117. REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 13. 
 118. See supra Part I.A.2.e. 
 119. Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 154–55 (1932) (―That a statute is 
a ‗public act‘ within the meaning of [the Clause] is settled.‖). 
 120. See supra notes 89–90 and accompanying text. 
 121. See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 (1942). 
 122. Pac. Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939); accord 
Franchise Tax Bd. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003). 
 123. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.10 (1981); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 
U.S. 408, 413 (1955). 
 124. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (citing Nevada v. Hall, 440 
U.S. 410, 421–24 (1979)). 
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alluded to the Clause‘s public policy exception with respect to applying 
sister-state statutes.125 
c.  Judgments and the Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement 
The full faith and credit command is most demanding with respect to 
judicial proceedings.126  In contrast to the accommodating statutory 
approach, an ―exacting‖ obligation denies states any discretion in choosing 
to recognize sister-state judgments.127  Simply put, there is ―no roving 
‗public policy exception‘‖ that might permit states to ignore another state‘s 
judgment.128  Through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, ―rights judicially 
established in any part are given nation-wide application.‖129 
Accordingly, sister-state judgments are entitled to nationwide force ―for 
claim and issue preclusion (res judicata) purposes.‖130  To qualify for this 
fullest treatment, a judgment must be final,131 and rendered by a court with 
 
 125. See Franchise Tax Bd., 538 U.S. at 499 (quoting Carroll, 349 U.S. at 413) (―States‘ 
sovereignty interests are not foreign to the full faith and credit command.  But we are not 
presented here with a case in which a State has exhibited a ‗policy of hostility to the public 
Acts‘ of a sister State.‖).  Some scholars assert that, though the public policy allowance was 
part of the law-of-nations approach to conflict of laws, the Clause was intended to eliminate 
the exception. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the 
Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1971–72, 1985–86 (1997) 
(arguing that the public policy exception was ―a matter of customary international law‖ and 
had been ―incorporated into American practice with no particular thought given to its 
appropriateness in the context of a federal system defined by a written constitution,‖ but that 
―[t]he central object of the Clause was . . . to eliminate a state‘s prideful unwillingness to 
recognize other states‘ laws or judgments on the ground that these are inferior or 
unacceptable‖); Laycock, supra note 29, at 313 (―The public-policy exception is a relic 
carried over from international law without reflection on the changes in interstate relations 
wrought by the Constitution.‖). 
 126. See, e.g., REYNOLDS & RICHMAN, supra note 27, at 71–74; William L. Reynolds, The 
Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV. 412, 412–14 (1994). 
 127. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943). 
 130. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.  The Supreme Court first articulated this comparison in 
1942. See Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 349 (1942) (―By the Constitutional 
provision for full faith and credit, the local doctrines of res judicata, speaking generally, 
[became] a part of national jurisprudence.‖).  American res judicata doctrine is an almost 
entirely judge-made body of law governing both the issue and claim preclusive effects of 
judgment. ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA:  A HANDBOOK ON ITS 
THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE 5, 9 (2001).  Issue preclusion refers to the bar on 
relitigation of matters actually litigated and determined. Id. at 11.  Claim preclusion refers to 
a judgment‘s extinguishing of claims presented for adjudication, whether or not all matters 
within the claim were litigated in the action. Id. 
 131. Baker, 522 U.S. at 233.  For purposes of full res judicata effect (both issue and claim 
preclusion), ―[a] judgment is final when all the issues on which it turns have been decided‖ 
and ―the trial court has concluded the regular proceedings in adjudicating the claim.‖ CASAD 
& CLERMONT, supra note 130, at 51–52.  Even judgments that control future activity and 
may be subject to modification, such as custody determinations, are ―sufficiently final‖ for 
res judicata purposes because any change in circumstances that might allow modification 
would create different claims and issues. Id. at 51.  Nevertheless, because of uncertainty 
among courts as to whether custody determinations qualified as ―final judgments‖ for 
purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Congress exercised its Effects Clause authority 
with the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) of 1980. See Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 
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both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.132  Although each jurisdiction 
independently generates its own distinctive res judicata body of law,133 the 
extent of a judgment‘s preclusive effect in a sister state is defined by the 
rendering state.134 
Similarly, because a state may not dictate the extraterritorial effect of its 
judgment beyond what the state provides within its borders,135 
―[e]nforcement measures do not travel‖ with the judgment.136  Enforcement 
measures broadly encompass state practices ―regarding the time, manner, 
and mechanisms for enforcing judgments‖137 and include statutes of 
limitations, execution procedures, garnishment availability, and provisions 
governing property interests and creditor prioritizing for debtor 
judgments.138  Accordingly, an enforcing state may refuse an order that 
―purport[s] to accomplish an official act within [its] exclusive province.‖139 
Though the Full Faith and Credit Clause grants a state control over its 
enforcement mechanisms, the Clause requires that the state apply them in 
an ―evenhanded‖ manner.140  The enforcing state may not, for example, 
―under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the enforcement of 
claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and credit clause‖ 
when those claims were validly rendered.141 
5.  Enforcing the Full Faith and Credit Clause:  Thompson v. Thompson 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is most commonly invoked by litigants 
after one court refuses to substantively recognize the laws or judgments of 
another state.142  In Thompson v. Thompson,143 the Supreme Court 
 
Stat. 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006)); infra note 149 and accompanying text.  
The PKPA requires that the ―appropriate authorities‖ of every state ―shall enforce . . . and 
shall not modify‖ sister-state custody or visitation determinations, except under certain 
enumerated circumstances. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a). 
 132. See Baker, 522 U.S. at 233; see also CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 130, at 49–50 
(identifying this res judicata requirement as ―validity,‖ which requires valid subject-matter 
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, and adequate notice). 
 133. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 130, at 5. 
 134. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982); Fauntleroy v. 
Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237–38 (1908); supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 135. See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text. 
 136. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235 (citing McElmoyle ex rel. Bailey v. Cohen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 
312, 323 (1839)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 99 (1971) (―The 
local law of the forum determines the methods by which a judgment of another state is 
enforced.‖). 
 137. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235. 
 138. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 72. 
 139. Baker, 522 U.S. at 235. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 643 (1935) (citing Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. 
(5 Wall.) 290, 300 (1866)); see also Philadelphia v. Bauer, 478 A.2d 773, 777 (N.J. 1984) 
(―‗The legislature cannot accomplish indirectly that which it could not do directly.‘‖ 
(quoting Coons v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 463 A.2d 921, 927 (N.J. 1983))).  The Bauer court 
continued, ―A state may not by subterfuge refuse to give full faith and credit to the judgment 
of a sister state.‖ Id. at 777. 
 142. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 154 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
400 (2011); Brief for Dean Erwin Chemerinsky, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting the 
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addressed whether the Clause provided a private federal cause of action to 
―enforce‖ the Clause when two conflicting state orders existed, but neither 
state court had denied recognition to the other‘s order.144 
In Thompson, a father brought suit in federal court against his ex-wife, 
and sought an order declaring the validity of a Louisiana order that had 
granted him custody of their child, while invalidating a California custody 
order in favor of his wife.145  The plaintiff did not allege a violation of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause because he had not challenged the California 
order in state court prior to initiating the case in federal court.146  Instead, 
he based the action against his wife on a full faith and credit provision in 
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act147 (PKPA). 
The Thompson court ruled that the PKPA‘s full faith and credit reference 
did not provide an implied private cause of action in federal court to 
determine which of two conflicting custody orders should prevail.148  In the 
Court‘s words, the purpose of the PKPA was to increase a state court‘s full 
faith and credit obligation owed to custody orders, whose status as ―final 
judgments‖ was in doubt because they were modifiable.149  The Supreme 
Court found that Congress intended the PKPA to have the ―same operative 
effect‖ as the Full Faith and Credit Act.150  The Court reasoned that the 
PKPA was ―most naturally construed‖ as a ―mandate directed to state 
courts‖ and therefore, did not ―create an entirely new cause of action‖ 
beyond challenging a state court‘s denial of full faith and credit.151 
In its analysis, the Thompson court observed that ―the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause, in either its constitutional or statutory incarnations, does not 
give rise to an implied federal cause of action.‖152  The Court, citing 1904‘s 
Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., noted that the Clause ―only 
prescribes a rule by which courts, Federal and state, are to be guided‖ when 
deciding the effect and applicability of sister-state laws or statutes.153 
Expressing concern that federal review to enjoin a state custody order 
would require inquiry into states‘ substantive domestic relationship 
 
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, Adar, No. 11-46 (U.S. July 11, 2011), 2011 WL 
3584748, at *11. 
 143. 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
 144. Id. at 179–80. 
 145. Id. at 178–79. 
 146. Id. at 178. 
 147. Pub. L. No. 96-611, 94 Stat. 3568 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006)); see supra 
note 131. 
 148. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179–80. 
 149. See id. at 180–82 (―[T]he principal problem Congress was seeking to remedy was 
the inapplicability of full faith and credit requirements to custody determinations.‖). 
 150. Id. at 183. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 182 (citing Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904)).  In Minnesota v. 
Northern Securities Co., Minnesota argued that a question of according full faith and credit 
to its laws was grounds for removal to federal court where the state alleged that Northern 
Securities had violated state antitrust law. 194 U.S. 48, 71–72 (1904).  The Supreme Court 
dismissed this argument as irrelevant and observed that ―the clause has nothing to do with 
the conduct of individuals or corporations.‖ Id. at 72. 
 153. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 182–83 (citing Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S. at 72). 
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determinations, the Supreme Court also found that Congress did not intend 
to involve the federal courts in the enforcement of state custody orders.154  
It dismissed the suggestion that federal review was necessary because state 
courts were ―unable or unwilling‖ to give full faith and credit to sister-state 
custody determinations.155  Accordingly, the Thompson court concluded 
that the full faith and credit mandate encompassed in the PKPA did not 
create a cause of action for an individual against another individual for 
federal review of the validity of conflicting state custody decrees.156 
B.  The Twenty-First Century Brady Bunch:  
Adoption, Legal Parenthood, and Same-Sex Couples 
Part I.B presents an overview of the American process of adoption.  First, 
it explores state and federal law governing adoption practice, with a focus 
on state policies that control adoption by gays, lesbians, and same-sex 
couples.  Next, this section explains the rights and obligations created by 
adoption, while providing detail on state statutes that require the issuance of 
revised birth certificates following an adoption. 
 
1.  The Requirement of Judicial Sanction 
Though a ―creature of . . . statutes,‖157 adoption is sealed with a 
judgment.158  Since Massachusetts enacted the first modern American 
adoption statute in 1851,159 a distinctive feature of American adoption 
practice has been the requirement of a judicial finding that the ―best 
interests‖ of the child are served.160  Prior to 1851, private transfers effected 
 
 154. Id. at 186 n.4.  The Supreme Court also noted the ―extraordinary nature‖ of such an 
action that would allow federal review of a state trial court‘s decision prior to review by a 
state‘s appellate or highest court. Id. at 187 n.5. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. 1 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02[1] (2008).  
There was no common law right to adoption. Id.  For a history of adoption from Roman 
times, and of the development of American law, see generally Leo Albert Huard, The Law of 
Adoption:  Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L. REV. 743 (1956), and Stephen B. Presser, The 
Historical Background of the American Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443 (1971). 
 158. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][a]–[b]. 
 159. See, e.g., id. § 1.02[2]; id. app. 1-A. 
 160. See, e.g., UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-703(a) cmt., 9 U.L.A. 94 (1994) (―A judicial 
determination that a proposed adoption will be in the best interest of the minor adoptee is an 
essential—and ultimately the most important—prerequisite to the granting of the 
adoption.‖); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law:  Child 
Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796–1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1042–43 (1979) 
(describing the 1851 Massachusetts adoption statute as the first ―modern‖ adoption law and 
emphasizing its ―notable‖ feature that ―[t]he heart of the adoption transaction became the 
judicially monitored transfer of rights‖).  A child‘s ―best interests‖ were defined more in 
economic than in psychological terms well into the twentieth century. See 1 HOLLINGER ET 
AL., supra note 157, § 1.03[2].  Beginning in the 1930s, the modern view of adoption 
emerged, characterized by concern for the social and psychological well-being of the child. 
See id. § 1.04. 
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adoption in America.161  Adoption was viewed as a contract between adults 
to address concerns of inheritance and the continuity of the adopter‘s 
family.162 
The shift in American adoption law, from private contracts to public 
statutes requiring judicial approval, reflected a realization ―of what is 
accomplished in the legal act of adopting‖—the endowment to the adopted 
child of rights equal to that of a natural child.163  The magnitude of this 
result necessitated state involvement to protect the child.164  The modern 
approach therefore incorporated an ―expanded [judicial] authority to 
employ . . . discretion‖ that already existed for the resolution of custody 
disputes.165  In sum, ―the public sector triumphed over the private‖ in 
American adoption policy.166 
Although an agency or individuals may now ―arrange‖ an adoption,167 
the legal relationship of parent and child cannot be created without a 
judicial decree.168  A court must determine a biological parent‘s consent (or 
waiver) and a child‘s ―best interests‖ before any legal rights or obligations 
transfer.169  Despite a common standard of ―best interests,‖ however, state 
adoption statutes rarely define the term with specificity.170  As a result of 
state legislatures‘ silence, courts hold broad authority in evaluating and 
finalizing adoptions.171 
2.  Judicial Adoption Procedures and Determining a Child‘s ―Best Interests‖ 
Both the state legislature and judiciary share in controlling the privilege 
to legally adopt,172 with a statute directing who may adopt and how, and a 
judge deciding who and what will serve the child‘s ―best interests.‖173  
 
 161. See Presser, supra note 157, at 461–64; Zainaldin, supra note 160, at 1075–83. 
 162. See Huard, supra note 157, at 748–49. 
 163. Presser, supra note 157, at 463–64. 
 164. Adoption, therefore, involves a state‘s parens patriae interest in ―preserving and 
promoting the welfare of the child‖ with the goal of providing a permanent home. Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); see also BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY 1221 (9th ed. 
2009) (defining parens patriae as, literally, ―parent of the country,‖ and, in application, to 
―the state in its capacity as provider of protection to those unable to care for themselves‖). 
 165. Zainaldin, supra note 160, at 1052, 1085–86. 
 166. Id. at 1089. 
 167. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, §§ 3.01–4. 
 168. See id. § 4.03[1]; Zainaldin, supra note 160, at 1042–43. 
 169. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][a]–[b]. 
 170. See id. § 4.01[1]; see also, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-727a (West Supp. 
2011) (listing legislative findings that the best interests of a child in adoption are promoted 
―by having persons in the child‘s life who manifest a deep concern for the child‘s growth and 
development‖; when ―a child has as many persons loving and caring for the child as 
possible‖; and when ―the child is part of a loving, supportive and stable family‖). 
 171. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.01[1] (noting that ―most adoption 
statutes do not include a list of specific factors to be considered in making a best interests 
determination‖); see also In re L.W., 613 A.2d 350, 355 (D.C. 1992) (asserting that a court‘s 
determination as to the ―best interests‖ of a child must be fact-specific because ―magic 
formulas have no place in decisions designed to salvage human values‖ (citing Lemay v. 
Lemay, 247 A.2d 189, 191 (N.H. 1968))). 
 172. See supra Part I.B.1. 
 173. See supra Part I.B.1. 
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Because the term ―best interests‖ lacks any uniform statutory description,174 
adoption law reflects diverse state policies regarding domestic relations and 
family law.175  In determining whether a particular household promotes a 
child‘s ―best interests,‖ the judicial gatekeeper must consider whether the 
prospective adopters are suitable.176  Among other factors,177 courts have 
accorded weight to an adopter‘s age,178 religion,179 race,180 marital 
status,181 and sexual orientation.182  Though state adoption law is diverse 
and therefore inconsistent,183 courts commonly articulate the goal of 
adoption statutes as providing the child with a loving, stable, and permanent 
home.184  Nevertheless, attempts to achieve uniformity among state 
adoption law and procedures have largely faltered.185 
 
 174. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.01[1]. 
 175. Compare FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042 (West 2003) (prohibiting any homosexual 
person from adopting), invalidated by Florida Dep‘t of Children & Families v. Adoption of 
X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 2010), and G.S. v. T.B., 985 So. 2d 978, 983 (Fla. 2008) 
(describing the goal of Florida‘s adoption scheme as a ―stable, permanent, and loving 
environment‖ for an adopted child), with In re M.M.D., 662 A.2d 837, 857 (D.C. 1995) 
(describing the purpose of the District of Columbia‘s adoption statute as to ―provide a 
loving, nurturing home‖ and concluding that a committed, unmarried same-sex couple could 
fulfill this purpose). 
 176. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[1]. 
 177. See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 965 
(4th ed. 2010) (listing decisions that considered adopter‘s intelligence, undisclosed 
pregnancy, or deafness). 
 178. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[2].  For commentary on the 
consideration of this factor, see generally Sara C. Mills, Perpetuating Ageism via Adoption 
Standards and Practices, 26 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC‘Y 69 (2011). 
 179. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[3].  For commentary on the 
consideration of this factor, see generally Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?:  The 
Use of Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 383 
(1989). 
 180. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[4].  For commentary on the 
consideration of this factor, see generally Elizabeth Bartholet, Where Do Black Children 
Belong?  The Politics of Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991); Ruth-
Arlene W. Howe, Race Matters in Adoption, 42 FAM. L.Q. 465 (2008). 
 181. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 3.06[5].  For commentary on the 
consideration of this factor, see generally Richard F. Storrow, Rescuing Children from the 
Marriage Movement:  The Case Against Marital Status Discrimination in Adoption and 
Assisted Reproduction, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 305 (2006); Lynn D. Wardle, Preference for 
Marital Couple Adoption—Constitutional and Policy Reflections, 5 J.L. FAM. STUD. 345 
(2003). 
 182. See WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 177, at 966–72; infra Part I.B.3. 
 183. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, §§ 1.01[1], 4.03[2]. 
 184. See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 756 (Ill. 1981) (explaining that Illinois‘s 
adoption statute benefits an adoptee ―by providing a home, support, a family unit, and loving 
care‖); In re Adoption of K.F., 935 N.E.2d 282, 289 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing In re 
Adoption of N.W., 933 N.E.2d 909, 914 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)) (reiterating that the purpose of 
Indiana‘s adoption statutes is to provide ―stable family units‖ for children). 
 185. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[1] (noting that only six states 
adopted the original Uniform Adoption Act, a model code promulgated in 1951 by the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, 
The Uniform Adoption Act:  Reporter’s Ruminations, 30 FAM. L.Q. 345, 345, 377 (1996) 
(describing the process of drafting the Uniform Adoption Act of 1994 as ―bitterly divisive‖ 
and acknowledging that the Act faced immediate ―intense criticism‖ from lobbying groups). 
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Though most adoption proceedings are non-adversarial,186 states 
generally require that a petitioner file a pleading187 and give notice to 
interested parties,188 and that a court hold a hearing189 and issue a judicial 
finding approving the adoption.190  When a natural parent contests an 
adoption, the procedural requirements are more stringent.191  Similarly, 
where the termination of the natural parents‘ rights, if required,192 occurs 
prior to or as a consequence of an adoption judgment, the judicial 
proceedings may be more vigorous.193  Reflecting a growing trend among 
states, the Uniform Adoption Act194 (UAA) requires an evaluation of the 
prospective parents for all adoptions, whether placements by individuals or 
agencies, that may then be submitted to the court.195  Finally, even where 
uncontested, adoptions entail judicial scrutiny and are not automatically 
approved.196 
3.  State and Federal Laws Addressing Access to Adoption 
for Gays and Lesbians 
One way in which state statutes control access to adoption is by 
specifying certain means to create legal parentage.  For example, in a joint 
or dual petition adoption, both birth parents relinquish their parental rights, 
allowing a married couple to jointly assume legal parentage.197  In a 
stepparent adoption, the most common in the United States,198 a child is 
adopted by her custodial biological parent‘s new spouse.199  A second- 
parent adoption allows an adult who is not related to a child through 
biology or marriage to become a parent without affecting the legal 
relationship between the child and existing parent.200  Every procedure 
requires a judicial decree to establish the adopter‘s and adoptee‘s legal 
rights.201 
 
 186. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 40–42. 
 187. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-109 (2008). 
 188. See, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.11 (LexisNexis 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-
730 (2010). 
 189. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-8 (West 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-750 
(2008). 
 190. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.57 (West 2007). 
 191. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.09. 
 192. For example, where a stepparent or a same-sex partner is adopting her spouse‘s 
child, existing parental rights may not be terminated. See infra notes 199–200 and 
accompanying text. 
 193. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.04[1][a] (noting stricter evidentiary 
standards when an adoption entails the involuntary termination of parental rights). 
 194. UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-201, 9 U.L.A. 94 (1994). 
 195. See id.; 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.05[3][b]. 
 196. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 40 (listing decisions denying uncontested 
adoptions). 
 197. BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 164, at 56 (defining ―joint adoption‖). 
 198. Id. at 57. 
 199. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[1]. 
 200. See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 164, at 57 (noting that second-parent 
adoptions are especially used by lesbian and gay adults). 
 201. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 4.01[1]. 
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As of April 2012, sixteen states and the District of Columbia allow 
adoption by same-sex couples through joint or second-parent adoptions.202  
Some states have passed statutes to expressly permit such adoption, often 
abrogating prior decisions.203  In other states, appellate decisions 
interpreting opaque state statutes allow adoption by same-sex couples.204  
In ten additional states, trial courts have granted second-parent adoptions to 
a non-birth partner.205  At least seven states have laws limiting or 
prohibiting adoption by homosexual individuals.206 
Where families have challenged state laws restricting adoption based on 
the Federal Constitution, federal courts have expressed doubt as to whether 
a fundamental right to adopt or be adopted exists.207  Although the Eleventh 
Circuit rejected an Equal Protection challenge to a Florida statute 
prohibiting homosexuals from adopting,208 commentators continue to split 
as to whether this type of law violates the Federal Constitution.209  State 
appellate courts have concluded that laws barring adoption by homosexuals 
violate state constitutions on privacy210 or equal protection211 grounds. 
 
 202. See Adoption by LGBT Parents, NAT‘L CENTER FOR LESBIAN RTS., 
http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/2PA_state_list.pdf?docID=3201 (last updated 
March 2012). 
 203. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-5-203(1)(d.5)(I) (2011), abrogating In re Adoption 
of T.K.J., 931 P.2d 488 (Colo. App. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-724 (West 2004), 
abrogating In re Adoption of Baby Z., 724 A.2d 1035 (Conn. 1999). 
 204. See Adoption by LGBT Parents, supra note 202. 
 205. See id. 
 206. See id. (listing various restrictions found in seven states). 
 207. See, e.g., Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that ―whatever 
claim a prospective adoptive parent may have to a child, we are certain that it does not rise to 
the level of a fundamental liberty interest‖); Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1437 (5th 
Cir. 1990) (―[W]e cannot recognize a ‗fundamental right‘ to adopt a child.‖).  Courts 
dismissing claims that adoption is a fundamental right often cite Supreme Court dicta 
regarding fundamental privacy rights, in which the Court distinguished a foster family from 
a natural family by stating that the former ―has its source in state law and contractual 
arrangements.‖ Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 842–47 
(1977); see also Lindley v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 124, 131 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Smith and 
rejecting a claim of fundamental right to adoption); Lofton v. Kearney, 157 F. Supp. 2d 
1372, 1380 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (citing Smith and stating that no constitutional right to adopt or 
to be adopted exists), aff’d sub nom. Lofton v. Dep‘t of Children & Family Servs., 358 F.3d 
804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
 208. Lofton, 358 F.3d at 817–27 (upholding the constitutionality of the Florida statute and 
concluding that the legislature ―could have reasonably believed that prohibiting adoption 
into homosexual environments would further its interest in placing adoptive children in 
homes that will provide them with optimal developmental conditions‖). 
 209. Compare Martin R. Gardner, Adoption by Homosexuals in the Wake of Lawrence v. 
Texas, 6 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 19, 22 (2004) (concluding that Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2004), which held that sodomy bans are unconstitutional, ―leaves policy-makers free . . . to 
deny adoptions to parties involved in homosexual relationships‖), with Christopher D. 
Jozwiak, Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children and Family Services:  Florida’s 
Gay Adoption Ban Under Irrational Equal Protection Analysis, 23 LAW & INEQ. 407, 418–
22 (2005) (concluding that the Florida statute unconstitutionally excluded homosexuals from 
the process of adoption based on animus). 
 210. See Ark. Dep‘t of Human Servs. v. Cole, 2011 Ark. 145, --- S.W.3d ---. (holding that 
an Arkansas adoption statute that banned cohabiting same-sex couples from adoption 
violated an individual‘s fundamental right of privacy afforded by the Arkansas constitution). 
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4.  The Adoption Decree, ―Incidental‖ Rights of Parent and Child, and Birth 
Certificate Amendment Statutes 
The judicial sanction of adoption creates a legal relationship of parent 
and child that entails legally enforceable obligations.212  Generally, the 
adopter promises to support the child, relieves the biological parent of his or 
her rights and obligations, and gains full and exclusive parental rights over 
the child.213  Most state statutes provide that after an adoption, the child is 
treated as if she were the adopter‘s biological offspring.214  Absent ―fraud 
or some other fundamental irregularity,‖ an adoption decree is final and 
irrevocable.215  For these reasons, most scholars agree that an adoption 
judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in subsequent litigation.216 
In addition to a change in legal status, the child usually gains inheritance 
and property rights as provided by the state of the adoption.217  These 
―incidents‖218 of adoption—including an adoptee‘s right to her adoptive 
parent‘s name or her right to recover damages for the wrongful death of an 
adoptive parent—vary from state to state.219 
For example, in recognition of the new legal identity acquired by an 
adopted child, every state has a statute providing for the reissuance of a 
birth certificate following the out-of-state adoption of a child born in-
state.220  As suggested by the UAA, these statutes generally entitle a family 
to a new birth certificate including the name of the adoptive parents upon 
 
 211. See Fla. Dep‘t of Children & Families v. Adoption of X.X.G., 45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (striking down a Florida statute prohibiting any homosexual from 
adoption as violating the equal protection clause of the Florida constitution). 
 212. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[1]; Presser, supra note 157, at 445 
(distinguishing pre-1851 private contractual practice from modern legal adoption in that an 
adopted child could ―expect no assistance from the law in enforcing any obligations which 
his adopting parents might have toward him‖). 
 213. See 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][c]–[f]. 
 214. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-16 (West 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1508 
(2009); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844 n.51 
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring) (―Adoption . . . is recognized as the legal equivalent of 
biological parenthood.‖). 
 215. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, § 1.01[2][e]. 
 216. See, e.g., Barbara J. Cox, Adoptions by Lesbian and Gay Parents Must Be 
Recognized by Sister States Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause Despite Anti-marriage 
Statutes that Discriminate Against Same-Sex Couples, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 751, 752–53 
(2003) (―[A] valid, final adoption decree rendered in one state establishing a parent-child 
relationship between the adoptive parent[s] and the adoptive child[ren] must be recognized 
in every other state as equally valid as an adoption decree rendered in that other state.‖); 
Wasserman, supra note 107, at 7–10; Ralph U. Whitten, Choice of Law, Jurisdiction, and 
Judgment Issues in Interstate Adoption Cases, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 803, 841 (2003) (―There is 
no question that states must give effect to the valid adoption judgments of other states.‖). 
 217. 1 HOLLINGER ET AL., supra note 157, §§ 1.01[1]–[2][c], 12.03[1]. 
 218. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 290, cmt. b (1971). 
 219. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 75–79 (analyzing the incidental rights resulting 
from the change in legal status of each party to adoption). 
 220. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-9A-12 (LexisNexis 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 199.570 (LexisNexis 2007); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 35-1-417 (2011); Elizabeth J. Samuels, 
The Idea of Adoption:  An Inquiry into the History of Adult Adoptee Access to Birth Records, 
53 RUTGERS L. REV. 367, 376 (2001) (pointing out that the practice began in the 1930s). 
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submission of an authenticated adoption decree.221  States delegate this task 
to state registrars,222 clerks of the court,223 or agencies such as the 
department of health224 or bureau of vital statistics.225  Almost all states use 
gender-neutral and sexuality-neutral language by providing that the names 
of adoptive ―person‖ or ―parents‖ may be substituted.226  Nevertheless, in 
states where only married couples or single individuals can adopt,227 and 
same-sex couples cannot legally marry,228 out-of-state adoptive families 
involving same-sex couples have had difficulty in obtaining new birth 
certificates.229 
Courts and scholars dispute whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
governs the incidents of adoption.  One approach asserts that the incidental 
rights of adoption fall within an enforcement framework and are therefore 
outside the exacting full faith and credit owed to judgments.230  Another 
approach asserts that an adoption‘s incidental rights fall within the Clause‘s 
mandate of evenhanded enforcement.231  At least one court has declined to 
apply full faith and credit analysis to the issuance of revised birth 
certificates. 
In Davenport v. Little-Bowser, the Virginia Supreme Court held that the 
state registrar could not refuse to reissue a birth certificate with both names 
of an out-of-state adoptive same-sex couple when the relevant statute 
referred to only ―adoptive parents‖ and ―intended parents.‖232  Virginia first 
argued that other birth certificate regulations referring to ―mother‖ and 
 
 221. See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 3-802, 9 U.L.A. 94 (1994). 
 222. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2423 (Supp. 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-02.1-05 
(Supp. 2011). 
 223. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.170 (2010). 
 224. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 338-20 (West 2008). 
 225. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-21 (West 2007). 
 226. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-406 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 3126 
(2003); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 210, § 6A (LexisNexis 2011). 
 227. For example, in Mississippi, Nebraska, and Utah. See States with Restrictions on 
Adoption or Fostering by LGB People, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
aclu_map1.pdf (last updated February 14, 2012). 
 228. For example, in Florida, Montana, Oklahoma, and Virginia. See Defining Marriage:  
Defense of Marriage Acts and Same-Sex Marriage Laws, NAT‘L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/human-services/same-sex-marriage-overview.aspx (last 
updated February 24, 2012). 
 229. See, e.g., Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 611 S.E.2d 366 (Va. 2005); see also infra Part 
II. 
 230. See, e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 161 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 400 (2011) (concluding that while Louisiana must recognize under the Clause the 
preclusive effect of a sister-state adoption judgment granted to a same-sex couple, the 
Louisiana statute providing for the reissuance of the adopted child‘s birth certificate was 
governed by Louisiana law and, therefore, permitted the exclusion of the couple); Wardle, 
supra note 109, at 597–99, 616 (concluding that the Clause ―does not compel states with 
strong public policies against lesbigay adoption . . . to recognize or enforce lesbigay 
adoption decrees from other states that would effectively require the second state to 
legitimate lesbigay adoption and its incidents within its territory‖). 
 231. See Wasserman, supra note 107, at 82 (arguing that ―just as states must recognize 
sister-state adoptions regardless of public policy objections, they must afford sister-state 
adoptions the same incidents they afford to local adoptions‖). 
 232. Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 370–72; see VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-261 (2003). 
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―father‖ supported a restrictive reading of the adoption provision.233  In 
addition, Virginia contended that the state restriction of adoption to single 
individuals or to married couples sustained its interpretation.234  The 
Virginia Supreme Court concluded that a plain reading of the statute 
invalidated the state‘s arguments.235  The court declined to address the 
plaintiffs‘ full faith and credit claims, concluding, ―The sole issue in this 
case is the enforcement of [the Virginia code].‖236 
C.  The Beneficent Sword:  42 U.S.C. § 1983 and ―Other‖ Constitutional 
Clauses 
Part I.C explores when individuals may maintain actions against state 
officials for deprivation of constitutional rights, other than traditional civil 
rights such as anti-discrimination and equal protection.  Part I.C.1 
introduces the text and purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  Part I.C.2 focuses on 
how the Supreme Court determines whether a constitutional provision 
creates a right that is actionable under § 1983.  Since lower courts 
considering whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause creates enforceable 
rights for purposes of § 1983 have cited recent Supreme Court analysis,237 
this section examines in detail the Court‘s decision that the Dormant 
Commerce Clause confers an individual right for purposes of § 1983. 
1.  The Purpose and Scope of § 1983 
Section 1983 allows a private citizen to bring a cause of action for 
incursions upon federal constitutional rights under color of state law.238  
Congress enacted this beneficent239 statute in 1871 in response to escalating 
racial discrimination in the South and, in particular, to address the state and 
local officials who refused to enforce existing legal protections.240 
 
 233. Davenport, 611 S.E.2d at 371–72. 
 234. Id. at 372. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Id. 
 237. See, e.g., Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 173–75 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (Wiener, J., 
dissenting), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 400 (2011). 
 238. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006).  Section 1983 provides, in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
Id. 
 239. See Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) (Section 1983 must be 
―liberally and beneficently construed‖ (quoting Congressman Samuel Shellabarger, who 
introduced the original act into the 42nd Congress in 1871)). 
 240. Section 1983 derives from Section 1 of the 1871 Civil Rights Act, Act of April 20, 
1871, 17 Stat. 13 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1983). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 171–73 (1961) (describing the origins of § 1983). 
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The statute was a part of the ―profound revolution in federalism‖241 that 
―alter[ed] the relationship between the States and the Nation.‖242  Section 
1983 focuses on vigilante state officers who abused their ―badge of 
authority‖ to deprive victims of protected rights.243  The ―very purpose‖ of 
§ 1983 was ―to interpose the federal courts between the States and the 
people, as guardians‖ of constitutional rights, and to protect individuals 
from unconstitutional state action, ―‗whether that action be executive, 
legislative, or judicial.‘‖244  Recognizing the ―paramount role Congress has 
assigned to the federal courts to protect constitutional rights,‖ there is no 
requirement of exhaustion of state judicial remedies under § 1983.245 
Although it ―lay virtually dormant‖ from the 1890s to the 1940s,246 
§ 1983 is now a ―sword‖247 and the primary vehicle for vindicating 
constitutional rights against violations by state actors.248  The Supreme 
Court has reiterated that the scope of the statute must be broadly and 
liberally construed.249  Both the expansive statutory language250 and the 
emphatic legislative history251 mandate this approach.  Accordingly, the 
Court has ―rejected attempts to limit the types of constitutional rights that 
are encompassed within the [statute‘s] phrase ‗rights, privileges, or 
immunities.‘‖252 
2.  Determining Constitutional Rights Within § 1983‘s Purview: 
Dennis v. Higgins 
Given § 1983‘s expansive breadth, the Supreme Court has considered 
several times whether constitutional provisions, other than those concerning 
 
 241. Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights—Will 
the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1985). 
 242. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
 243. Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 161 (1992) (―The purpose of § 1983 is to deter state 
actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally 
guaranteed rights and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails.‖ (citing Carey v. 
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 254–57 (1978))). 
 244. Mitchum, 407 U.S. at 242 (quoting Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346 (1879)). 
 245. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 472–73 (1974). 
 246. Blackmun, supra note 241, at 12. 
 247. 1 SHELDON H. NAHMOD, CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES LITIGATION:  THE LAW 
OF SECTION 1983, at § 1:1 (4th ed. 1997). 
 248. Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian 
Compromise, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 39, 185. 
 249. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 105 
(1989) (asserting that the Court has ―repeatedly held that the coverage of [§ 1983] must be 
broadly construed‖); Monell v. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 684 (1978) (emphasizing 
that § 1983 must be ―liberally and beneficently construed‖). 
 250. See, e.g., Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 445 (1991); Golden State Transit Corp., 
493 U.S. at 105. 
 251. See, e.g., Monell, 436 U.S. at 684; David Achtenberg, A ―Milder Measure of 
Villainy‖:  The Unknown History of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Meaning of ―Under Color of‖ 
Law, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 1, 5 (closely analyzing the development of the Ku Klux Act and 
§ 1983 and concluding that ―this history should dispel the remarkably persistent myth 
that . . . Congress never intended the provision to cover constitutional wrongs unless those 
wrongs were actually authorized by state law‖). 
 252. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 445 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
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equal protection or fundamental rights, confer an individual right vindicable 
under the statute.253  In Dennis v. Higgins,254 the Supreme Court held that 
the Dormant Commerce Clause255 conferred individual rights actionable 
under § 1983.256  The Supreme Court analyzed the provision according to 
three considerations.257  First, the Court asked whether the clause ―create[d] 
obligations binding on the governmental unit or rather [did] no more than 
express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment.‘‖258  
Second, the Court inquired whether the ―right‖ asserted was so ―vague and 
amorphous‖ to be ―beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.‖259  
Third, the Court determined whether the constitutional provision was 
―intended to benefit‖ the putative plaintiff.260 
Acknowledging that the Commerce Clause‘s text addressed only 
Congress, the Court concluded that the long-established understanding of 
the Commerce Clause as a limit to states‘ regulatory power supported its 
enforcement against states.261  Describing the Commerce Clause as a ―self-
executing limitation‖ on state power,262 the Supreme Court concluded that 
Congress intended its protection to benefit individuals engaged in interstate 
commerce.263  Focusing on the third consideration, the Court invoked its 
own ―repeated references to ‗rights‘‖ under the Commerce Clause as 
support for this conclusion.264 
In so holding, the Supreme Court rejected the defendants‘ three 
arguments that the Commerce Clause‘s protection was not a ―right‖ for 
purposes of § 1983 because:  first, the clause was only a power-allocating, 
rather than a right-conferring provision;265 second, the clause was designed 
to promote national economic and political union, rather than benefit 
 
 253. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 103 (Supremacy Clause); Carter v. 
Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885) (Contracts Clause). 
 254. 498 U.S. 439 (1991). 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.  The Commerce Clause provides that ―Congress shall 
have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, 
and with the Indian Tribes.‖ Id.  The Dormant Commerce Clause is the principle, inferred 
from the Section Eight provision, that ―state and local laws are unconstitutional if they place 
an undue burden on interstate commerce.‖ ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 450 
(3d ed. 2009). 
 256. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 450. 
 257. The three-factor inquiry was first articulated to determine whether a statutory 
provision created a privately enforceable right. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 
340–41 (1997). 
 258. Dennis, 498 U.S. at 448–49 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106). 
 259. Id. at 449 (quoting Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106). 
 260. Id. (quoting Golden State Transit Corp., 493 U.S. at 106). 
 261. Id. at 447.  The Court also emphasized that it had already held that individuals 
injured by state action in violation of the Commerce Clause were entitled to relief in a state 
court action brought under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. (citing McKesson Corp. v. Div. of 
Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990)). 
 262. Id. at 447 (quoting S.-Cent. Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984)). 
 263. Id. at 449. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 447.  The Court agreed that the Commerce Clause both allocated power and 
conferred an individual right. Id. 
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individuals;266 and third, the clause was subject to qualification or 
elimination by Congress.267 
The Supreme Court recently limited Dennis‘s holding by stating that the 
doctrine of comity required individuals asserting state violations of the 
Commerce Clause to proceed first in state court, rather than filing directly 
in federal court.268  The Court explained that the federal-state incarnation of 
comity ―serves to ensure that ‗the National Government, anxious though it 
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always 
endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate 
activities of the States.‘‖269 
II.  THE CONFLICT OVER RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
OUT-OF-STATE ADOPTION DECREES:  WHOSE DUTY IS IT AND WHAT IS 
―EVENHANDED‖? 
Part II of this Note details the conflict between U.S. Courts of Appeals 
over a state‘s obligation to reissue birth certificates to out-of-state adoptive 
parents.  Courts differ over whether the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
contains an enforceable obligation of recognition for various state actors, or 
a guiding rule for state courts faced with a law or judgment conflicting with 
the state‘s own law.  In addition, courts are split as to whether issuing a 
revised birth certificate falls within the Clause‘s provision for stringent 
recognition of sister-state adoptions.  In the following sections, this Note 
examines the two approaches to each of these issues. 
A.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
In Finstuen v. Crutcher,270 the Tenth Circuit held that an Oklahoma 
policy of refusing revised birth certificates to out-of-state same-sex 
adoptive parents violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause.271  The Finstuen 
plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of an amendment to Oklahoma‘s 
adoption code that prohibited any recognition of out-of-state adoptions by 
same-sex couples.272  Oklahoma residents Lucy and Jennifer Doel adopted 
 
 266. Id. at 449. 
 267. Id. at 450.  The Court dismissed this argument as ―too much,‖ observing that 
Congress could similarly alter or eliminate federal statutory rights. Id.  Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, writing for the dissent, elaborated on the defendants‘ first two arguments, stating 
that the Framers intended the Commerce Clause as a ―structural provision‖ to ―preserve 
economic union and to suppress interstate rivalry.‖ Id. at 453 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  The 
dissent concluded that ―[a]t best,‖ the Court‘s interpretation of the Commerce Clause granted 
an individual the ―right to have a judicial determination‖ nullifying the state tax that had 
violated the Commerce Clause. Id. at 458 (citing Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317, 322 
(1885)). 
 268. See Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 130 S. Ct. 2323, 2328 (2010). 
 269. Id. at 2336 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971)). 
 270. 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2007). 
 271. Id. at 1156. 
 272. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen v. Crutcher, 496 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 
2007).  Three couples originally filed suit, but two were found to lack standing. See 
Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1143–51. 
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their child, ―E,‖ in California in 2002.273  Upon the Doels‘ return to 
Oklahoma, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH) refused to 
issue a revised birth certificate listing both parents, and instead issued a 
certificate that named only Lucy Doel as E‘s mother.274 
In 2004, the Oklahoma Attorney General issued an opinion stating that 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause required the OSDH to issue revised birth 
certificates reflecting the parental relationship in the adoption judgment, 
irrespective of whether the parents were eligible to adopt in Oklahoma.275  
In response, the Oklahoma legislature amended its adoption code to prohibit 
any state agency or court from recognizing a sister-state adoption by two 
individuals of the same sex.276  The Doels then renewed their request, and 
were again denied a new birth certificate for E that included both mothers‘ 
names.277 
The Doels filed suit in federal court against three state executive 
officials:  the OSDH Commissioner, the Governor, and the Attorney 
General.278  The plaintiffs alleged violations of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Due Process Clause, as well as 
impairment of their constitutional right to travel.279  Explaining their injury, 
the Doels recounted an incident when E had to be taken to the emergency 
room in an ambulance, and both the ambulance crew and emergency room 
personnel stated that only ―E‘s mother‖ could accompany her.280 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma granted 
summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the full faith and credit, equal 
protection, and due process claims, and ordered that the Commissioner 
issue a new birth certificate listing both parents‘ names.281  Only the OSDH 
Commissioner, Dr. Michael Crutchen, appealed.282  The Tenth Circuit 
affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Commissioner‘s 
conduct in enforcing the amendment violated the state‘s obligation under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize a sister-state‘s judgment.283 
 
 273. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1142. 
 274. Id.  Since neither woman was E‘s biological parent, Lucy Doel first adopted E, and 
then six months later, Jennifer Doel adopted E through a second-parent adoption. Id. 
 275. See Question Submitted by:  Michael Crutcher, M.D., M.P.H., Commissioner of 
Health and State Health Officer, 2004 Op. Okla. Att‘y Gen. 8, ¶ 14, available at  
http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=438496. 
 276. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1142, 1146 (quoting OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 7502-1.4(A) (2007) 
(―[T]his state, any of its agencies, or any court of this state shall not recognize an adoption 
by more than one individual of the same sex from any other state or foreign jurisdiction.‖)). 
 277. Id. at 1146. 
 278. Id. at 1142. 
 279. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1300 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen, 496 F.3d 1139. 
 280. Id. at 1301. 
 281. Id. at 1315. 
 282. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1143, 1156. 
 283. Id. at 1156.  The Tenth Circuit declined to address the Doels‘ additional due process 
and equal protection claims. Id. 
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1.  An Individual May Bring a Federal Cause of Action 
Against State Executive Officials for Alleged Violations 
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
In Finstuen, the Tenth Circuit permitted the Doels to bring a § 1983 
claim against the OSDH Commissioner in his capacity as a state executive 
officer.284  Given that two of the original defendants did not pursue an 
appeal, the court clarified that Dr. Crutcher was an appropriately named 
defendant because plaintiffs may bring suit against a state officer connected 
to the enforcement of a challenged law.285  The Tenth Circuit also clarified 
the disposition of the case and stated that the Doels were not ―seek[ing] to 
enforce their adoption order against Dr. Crutcher in his official 
capacity . . . as a matter of claim or issue preclusion.‖286 
In dicta, the Finstuen court dismissed as lacking merit OSDH‘s claim 
that only a state court‘s denial of a sister-state adoption triggered the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause.287  Because this assertion was raised only on 
appeal, the court declined to address it substantively.288  Nevertheless, the 
Tenth Circuit concluded that the Commissioner of Health had ―failed to 
fulfill the constitutionally-imposed duty . . . to recognize another state‘s 
judgment.‖289 
2.  Reissuing a Birth Certificate Pursuant to State Law Is 
Within the Clause‘s Mandate 
Addressing the merits of Finstuen, the Tenth Circuit ruled that the 
unamended Oklahoma adoption statute must be applied to all judgments of 
adoption, regardless of whether they were held by out-of-state couples that 
could not adopt under Oklahoma law.290  First, the court identified ―a clear 
legislative expression of Oklahoma‘s public policy contrary to adoptions by 
same sex couples.‖291  However, quoting the Supreme Court‘s declaration 
in Baker v. General Motor Corp. that there is ―no roving ‗public policy 
exception‘ to the full faith and credit due judgments,‖292 the Tenth Circuit 
held that Oklahoma was obligated to recognize the Doels‘ California 
adoption decree.293 
In doing so, the court confirmed that adoption decrees were final 
judgments and, therefore, were entitled to the ―unequivocal‖ mandate of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.294  The court rejected the defendant‘s 
 
 284. See id. at 1141–42. 
 285. Id. at 1151 (citing Dairy Mart Convenience Stores, Inc. v. Nickel, 411 F.3d 367, 
372–73 (2d Cir. 2005)). 
 286. Id. at 1155. 
 287. Id. at 1155 n.13. 
 288. Id. 
 289. Id. at 1155. 
 290. Id. at 1156. 
 291. Id. at 1148–49 n.6. 
 292. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998). 
 293. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1152. 
 294. Id. 
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assertion that, despite requiring a judicial sanction, ―adoptions are a matter 
of contract between the parties and not a judicial proceeding in the usual 
sense of the word.‖295 
The court next dismissed the defendants‘ argument that requiring 
Oklahoma to issue a birth certificate when presented with a California 
adoption decree constituted the extraterritorial application of California 
law.296  According to the Tenth Circuit, such an assertion ―improperly 
conflate[d] [a state‘s] obligation to give full faith and credit to a sister 
state‘s judgment with its authority to apply its own state laws in deciding 
what state-specific rights and responsibilities flow from that judgment.‖297  
The court emphasized that its ruling was not allowing California ―control 
over the effect of its judgment‖ in Oklahoma.298 
Instead, the Tenth Circuit stated that it was requiring that state executive 
officials apply Oklahoma law in an ―‗evenhanded manner.‘‖299  Therefore, 
Oklahoma‘s amended statute violated the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
because it categorically denied the ―effective operation‖ of a class of out-of-
state adoption decrees.300 
B.  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
In contrast with the Tenth Circuit, the Fifth Circuit held that out-of-state 
unmarried adoptive couples were not entitled to amended birth certificates 
under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.301  In Adar v. Smith, a couple 
brought suit against the Louisiana Registrar after she refused to issue a 
revised birth certificate for the couple‘s adopted child.302  Mickey Smith 
and Oren Adar were an unmarried, same-sex couple who adopted 
Louisiana-born ―J‖ in New York in 2006.303  In the adoption proceedings, 
Smith and Adar also changed J‘s name from the one appearing on his 
original birth certificate.304  The couple then sought to have J‘s Louisiana 
birth certificate reissued with both fathers‘ names supplanting those of J‘s 
biological parents.305 
At the time, section 40 of Louisiana‘s adoption code provided for the 
issuance of a new birth certificate with the names of the ―adoptive parents‖ 
upon the showing of a properly certified out-of-state adoption decree.306  
 
 295. Finstuen v. Edmondson, 497 F. Supp. 2d 1295, 1305 (W.D. Okla. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom. Finstuen, 496 F.3d 1139; see Finstuen, 496 
F.3d at 1156. 
 296. Finstuen, 496 F.3d at 1153. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. at 1153–54 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1998)). 
 300. Id. at 1156. 
 301. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 160–61 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. 
Ct. 400 (2011). 
 302. Id. at 149–50. 
 303. Id. at 149.  The Louisiana Registrar‘s surname was also Smith. Id. at 146, 149. 
 304. Id. at 167 (Wiener, J., dissenting). 
 305. Id. at 149 (majority opinion). 
 306. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(A), (C) (1990).  The statute reads, in relevant part, 
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Another Louisiana statute made the Registrar the sole custodian of 
Louisiana birth certificates.307  When presented with Smith and Adar‘s 
authenticated New York adoption decree, the Louisiana Registrar, Darlene 
W. Smith, refused to reissue a birth certificate with both men‘s names.308 
In a letter denying the couple‘s request,309 the Registrar posited that 
section 40 applied only to adoption decrees possessed by married 
parents.310  She reasoned that section 40‘s term ―adoptive parents‖311 meant 
only married parents because, pursuant to a separate statute, Louisiana 
allowed only a ―husband and wife‖ to jointly adopt a child.312  The 
Registrar also relied on an Attorney General advisory opinion,313 which 
concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not require Louisiana to 
recognize out-of-state adoption judgments that violated Louisiana‘s ―strong 
public policy‖ against both adoption by unmarried individuals and same-sex 
marriage.314 
The family sued the Louisiana Registrar under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
asserting that her actions violated Adar, Smith, and J‘s rights under the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.315  As to injury, 
the family alleged that its inability to obtain an accurate birth certificate had 
caused problems related to obtaining medical insurance for J through Adar 
or Smith‘s employer.316  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause claim, ruling that the Clause required the defendants to 
recognize the out-of-state adoption judgment.317 
A Fifth Circuit panel affirmed the district court in 2010, holding that final 
adoption decrees were entitled to exacting credit.318  The panel also 
dismissed the Registrar‘s interpretation of section 40 as defying the 
 
When a person born in Louisiana is adopted in a court of proper jurisdiction in any 
other state or territory of the United States, the state registrar may create a new 
record of birth in the archives upon presentation of a properly certified copy of the 
final decree of adoption . . . .  Upon receipt of the certified copy of the decree, the 
state registrar shall make a new record in its archives, showing . . . [t]he names of 
the adoptive parents . . . . 
Id. 
 307. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149 n.1 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:2). 
 308. Id. at 149. 
 309. Adar v. Smith, 591 F. Supp. 2d 857, 859 (E.D. La. 2008), rev’d en banc, 639 F.3d 
146. 
 310. See Adar, 639 F.3d at 149–50. 
 311. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:76(C). 
 312. Adar, 639 F.3d at 149–50 (citing LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1221 (1992)). 
 313. Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859. 
 314. See Must the Vital Records Registrar Give Full Faith and Credit to an Out of State 
Adoption Judgment Obtained by Two Unmarried Individuals Adopting Jointly?, 06 Op. La. 
Att‘y Gen. 0325 (2007), available at http://www.ag.state.la.us/shared/viewdoc.aspx?Type=
4&doc=18900. 
 315. Adar, 639 F.3d at 150. 
 316. Adar, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 859 n.1. 
 317. Id. at 862. 
 318. Adar v. Smith, 597 F.3d 697, 719–20 (5th Cir.), vacated, 622 F.3d 426 (5th Cir. 
2010). 
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statute‘s unambiguous meaning.319  Finally, the Fifth Circuit panel 
emphasized that it was Louisiana‘s own statute that directed the Registrar to 
reissue birth certificates, while the Full Faith and Credit Clause required 
that section 40 be applied in an ―evenhanded‖ manner.320 
A few months later, the Fifth Circuit ordered a rehearing en banc.321  The 
en banc majority, in an opinion authored by Chief Judge Edith H. Jones, 
reversed the district court and held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did 
not govern the actions of a state executive official,322 and, even if it did, the 
Registrar‘s refusal was not unconstitutional because issuing a birth 
certificate was beyond the recognition required by the Clause.323  A keenly 
worded dissent324 argued that the Full Faith and Credit Clause imposed a 
duty on state officials, and therefore created individual ―correlative rights‖ 
vindicable under § 1983.325 
1.  The Clause Does Not Govern the Actions of a State Executive Official 
and Does Not Create Individual Rights Actionable Under § 1983 
In Adar, the Fifth Circuit majority concluded that the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause governed only state courts and not any other state actors.326  
According to the en banc majority, the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
introduced only a ―rule of decision‖ to guide courts—―[n]o more, no 
less.‖327  The court explained that the Clause governed only the res judicata 
effect of a judgment,328 which arose only when litigation was pursued in 
another state or federal court.  Accordingly, the court concluded that the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause was a rule for state courts, rather than an 
obligation imposed on all state actors generally.329 
Since the full faith and credit command fell only on courts, the Adar 
majority declared that ―it is incoherent to speak of vindicating full faith and 
 
 319. Id. at 718–19. 
 320. Id. at 714 (quoting Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 224 (1998)). 
 321. Adar, 622 F.3d 426. 
 322. See Adar v. Smith, 639 F.3d 146, 154 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 
400 (2011). 
 323. Id. at 160–61. 
 324. See id. at 166 (Wiener, J., dissenting) (―Only by judicial legerdemain, is the en banc 
majority able to conclude [that the Louisiana Registrar did not violate the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause] . . . .  I lament that, in its determination to sweep this high-profile and 
admittedly controversial case out the federal door . . . the en banc majority . . . strips 
federal . . . courts of subject matter jurisdiction . . . [and] [u]nduly cabins, if not emasculates 
[Supreme Court precedent].‖). 
 325. Id. at 165–87. 
 326. Id. at 154 (majority opinion). 
 327. Id. at 151.  The Fifth Circuit majority cited Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174 
(1988), for the proposition that the Clause was a rule of decision. Adar, 639 F.3d at 153 n.13; 
see supra notes 152–53 and accompanying text. 
 328. Adar, 639 F.3d at 153; see supra notes 130–34 and accompanying text.  The en banc 
majority noted the Supreme Court‘s distinction between the credit owed to laws and 
judgments. Adar, 639 F.3d at 154 n.3 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 
(1998)).  The Fifth Circuit described the credit owed to judgments as ―simpler‖ than the 
credit owed to laws. Id. 
 329. Adar, 639 F.3d at 154. 
3128 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80 
credit rights against non-judicial state actors.‖330  The Fifth Circuit majority 
acknowledged that the Supreme Court ―ha[d] at times referred to the clause 
in terms of individual ‗rights,‘‖ but asserted that the Court ―consistently 
identifie[d] the violators of that right as state courts.‖331  The court 
therefore ruled that the § 1983 cause of action could not be sustained 
against state executive officials to enforce full faith and credit for out-of-
state adoption decrees.332 
In so holding, the en banc majority concluded that Adar, Smith, and J 
should have sought to compel the issuance of a revised birth certificate in 
Louisiana state court, rather than through a federal cause of action.333  
Under the majority‘s construction, only a state court‘s denial of the parents‘ 
request would implicate the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and even then 
only upon Supreme Court review of state court decisions.334 
Observing in a footnote that the Full Faith and Credit Clause addressed 
itself to ―each state,‖ not to ―each state‘s court,‖ the en banc majority 
acknowledged that one might consider its interpretation ―curious.‖335  The 
Fifth Circuit suggested that a contrary holding would create a ―serious 
anomaly‖ whereby individuals pursuing § 1983 claims for violations by 
state executive officials ―would have [the] considerable advantage‖ of 
immediate federal court redress.336  Individuals facing violations by state 
courts, on the other hand, would obtain federal redress only upon Supreme 
Court review.337 
In a specially concurring opinion, Judge Leslie H. Southwick 
acknowledged that only a single Supreme Court sentence precluded the 
dissent‘s ―good arguments‖ that the Full Faith and Credit Clause conferred 
individual rights for purposes of § 1983.338  The concurrence cited 
Thompson,339 in which the Supreme Court had adopted language from 
1904‘s Northern Securities when stating that the Clause ―only prescribes a 
rule by which courts . . . are to be guided.‖340  But for this recent 
articulation, Judge Southwick would have considered Northern Securities 
an ―anachronism from a day before the rediscovery of Section 1983.‖341  
Accordingly, Judge Southwick joined the Fifth Circuit majority‘s holding 
 
 330. Id. 
 331. Id. 
 332. Id. at 153–54. 
 333. Id. at 158. 
 334. See id. (―After Appellees‘ case has been submitted to the state courts, the full faith 
and credit clause may provide the federal question to support Supreme Court review.‖ (citing 
Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187 (1962))). 
 335. Id. at 154 n.6. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Id. at 164–65 (Southwick, J., specially concurring). 
 339. 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
 340. Adar, 639 F.3d at 164 (Southwick, J., specially concurring); see Thompson, 484 U.S. 
at 182–83 (quoting Minnesota v. N. Sec. Co., 194 U.S. 48, 72 (1904)); see supra notes 152–
53 and accompanying text. 
 341. Adar, 639 F.3d at 164 (Southwick, J., specially concurring). 
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that the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not create a right enforceable 
against state executive officers.342 
2.  Issuing a Birth Certificate Is Enforcement of a Judgment, 
and Therefore Outside of the Clause‘s Mandate 
The Fifth Circuit majority then ruled in the alternative that, even if the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause did govern the actions of a state official, the 
Louisiana Registrar did not deny recognition to the New York adoption 
decree when she declined to reissue a new birth certificate for J.343  The 
court distinguished between recognizing the existence of the parental 
relationship—which the Registrar did, and was obligated to do under the 
Clause—and reissuing the birth certificate, a separate act of enforcement.344 
According to the majority, issuing a revised birth certificate fell in the 
―heartland of enforcement‖ and was therefore beyond the mandate of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause.345  The court cited the Supreme Court for the 
proposition that the Clause ―does not compel ‗a state to substitute the 
statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter 
concerning which it is competent to legislate.‘‖346  Thus, the Fifth Circuit 
explained, outside of the res judicata effect required by the Clause, 
Louisiana was the ―sole mistress‖ of directing the rights created by out-of-
state adoption decrees.347  In so holding, the en banc majority reasoned that 
a new birth certificate was an ―incidental benefit[]‖ to adoption, rather than 
a right created by the couple‘s New York adoption.348 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Louisiana had fulfilled its obligation 
under Baker to apply its laws concerning the ―enforcement‖ of out-of-state 
judgments in an ―evenhanded‖ way.349  The en banc majority stated that 
because Louisiana did not permit any unmarried couples to obtain revised 
birth certificates, the state was under no obligation to issue one to Adar and 
Smith.350  The Fifth Circuit majority concluded that the manner in which 
Louisiana enforced sister-state adoptions did not violate the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause.351 
 
 342. Id.  Finding the case resolved by this question, Judge Southwick would not have 
addressed whether the Louisiana Registrar‘s actions constituted a failure to recognize the 
New York adoption decree. Id. at 165. 
 343. Id. at 158 (majority opinion). 
 344. See id. at 159 (―The Registrar acknowledged that even though she would not issue 
the requested birth certificate with both names, the Registrar recognizes [Adar and Smith] as 
the legal parents of their adopted child.‖). 
 345. Id. at 160. 
 346. Id. (quoting Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722 (1988) (quoting Pac. 
Emp‘rs Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm‘n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939))). 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. at 161. 
 349. Id. at 159 (citing Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998)); see supra 
notes 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 350. Adar, 639 F.3d at 161. 
 351. Id. 
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III.  CLASH OF POLICIES:  RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF OUT-OF-
STATE ADOPTION DECREES UNDER THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE 
As detailed in Part II, federal circuit courts have split regarding the effect 
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause obliges state officials to give to out-of-
state adoption decrees.  The conflict accentuates the Supreme Court‘s 
distinction between recognition and enforcement under the Clause.352  The 
uncertainty over the Clause‘s command reflects the tension between the 
competing interests that the Clause balances:  a federal interest in national 
unity;353 each state‘s interest in asserting its own policies within its 
territory;354 each state‘s interest in the finality and integrity of its 
judgments;355 and individuals‘ interest in the security of rights and 
obligations established by judgment.356  This Note argues that the federal, 
state, and individual interests in finality and unity outweigh a state‘s policy 
preferences.  This Note therefore asserts that states must give meaningful 
recognition to out-of-state adoption decrees pursuant to the Clause, even 
when such judgments are contrary to the state‘s own policy. 
Part III.A addresses the potential misapplication of the division between 
enforcement and recognition, arguing that states may not apply the 
distinction to undermine the substantive rights created by judgments.  Part 
III.B asserts that, in addition to balancing state and federal power, the 
Clause confers an individual right to recognition of sister-state judgments 
that is vindicable under § 1983 when refused by a state official. 
A.  Clarifying the Distinction Between Recognition and Enforcement 
Although the Supreme Court has articulated a distinction between a 
judgment‘s recognition and enforcement for purposes of the Full Faith and 
Credit Clause,357 states may not reframe this distinction to escape their 
constitutional obligation.  It is well established that states must recognize 
out-of-state judgments and may apply their own enforcement measures.358  
To comply with the Clause, however, states also must apply their 
enforcement mechanisms in an ―evenhanded manner.‖359  Thus, both 
recognition and enforcement fall under the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s 
command. 
Although the distinction allows for local variance in enforcement 
measures,360 it does not constitute a de facto public policy exception to a 
state‘s constitutional obligation.  The Supreme Court has clearly stated that 
there is ―no roving ‗public policy exception‘‖ to the credit owed to 
 
 352. See supra notes 135–41 and accompanying text. 
 353. See supra notes 92–94, 110 and accompanying text. 
 354. See supra notes 95, 97 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 356. See supra notes 102–06 and accompanying text. 
 357. See supra notes 135–39 and accompanying text. 
 358. See supra notes 96–97, 136–37 and accompanying text. 
 359. See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
 360. See supra notes 136–38 and accompanying text. 
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judgments.361  Instead, the distinction reflects the Clause‘s balancing of 
state and federal interests.  Though formulated as a unifying instrument of 
federalism,362 the Clause does not demand uniformity in policy among 
states.363  Instead, the Clause requires uniform respect for the integrity and 
finality of sister-state judgments.364 
The finality of sister-state adoption decrees includes the legal status of 
parent and child.365  The Supreme Court has long established that 
recognition under the Full Faith and Credit Clause speaks not only to the 
facial ―validity‖ of a judgment, but also its substance or ―effect.‖366  The 
effect of the judicial sanction of adoption is a legal relationship of parent 
and child.367  A state‘s refusal to recognize a legally created status as 
adoptive parent or child violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s stringent 
command regarding judgments. 
Even if the issuance of a revised birth certificate is termed ―enforcement‖ 
of ―incidental rights‖ of adoption,368 states should not be able to manipulate 
their enforcement provisions to avoid their Full Faith and Credit Clause 
obligation to recognize sister-state judgments.369  The Supreme Court‘s 
mandate that a state apply its enforcement mechanisms in an ―evenhanded 
manner‖ prohibits that state from undermining or undoing the substantive 
rights created by a judgment.370  In the context of judgments, the Clause‘s 
command orders ―submission by one State even to hostile policies reflected 
in the judgment of another State.‖371  Thus, the federal, state, and individual 
interests underlying the Clause‘s strict command for judgments outweigh a 
single state‘s interest in asserting its own policy, in the context of 
judgments.372 
Interpreting a statute that refers only to ―adoptive parents‖ to exclude 
same-sex couples based on separate statutory provisions improperly 
incorporates public policy into a state‘s recognition of sister-state 
judgments.373  Where an in-state statute provides for in-state operation of 
out-of-state adoption decrees, a state registrar should not be free to 
discriminate based on any disagreement with another state‘s policy that 
gave rise to the judgment.374  This discrimination against other states‘ 
policies is precisely what the Framers sought to end with the Full Faith and 
 
 361. See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 362. See supra notes 91–94 and accompanying text. 
 363. See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 364. See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
 365. See supra notes 212–16 and accompanying text. 
 366. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text. 
 367. See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text. 
 368. See supra notes 141, 344–45 and accompanying text. 
 369. See supra notes 110, 128 and accompanying text. 
 370. See supra notes 77–78, 140–41 and accompanying text. 
 371. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
 372. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
 373. See supra notes 128, 141 and accompanying text. 
 374. See supra notes 99–101 and accompanying text. 
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Credit Clause.375  This limit on state sovereignty is a ―price‖ of a federal 
system.376 
Furthermore, a state executive official‘s interpretation of statutory 
language to withhold recognition or enforcement undermines the separation 
of powers principle underlying the Full Faith and Credit Clause.377  By 
substituting her own interpretation for that of the state legislature, so as to 
undermine the validity and integrity of a sister-state judgment, a state 
official infringes on the authority of both the judiciary and legislature to 
determine state policies.378  Therefore, the distinction between enforcement 
and recognition does not render the Clause powerless to a state‘s 
application of its own enforcement mechanisms to an out-of-state judgment. 
B.  A State’s Binding Obligation Under the Clause Confers an Individual 
Right to Equal Recognition that Is Vindicable Under § 1983 
While the Supreme Court has never stated that § 1983 can be used for 
Full Faith and Credit Clause violations, its application of § 1983 to the 
Commerce Clause indicates that the Court may be willing to recognize its 
use in Full Faith and Credit Clause cases because both clauses serve to 
unify states by limiting state authority.  Indeed, the Supreme Court has 
equated the Clause‘s ―unifying force‖ to that of the Commerce Clause.379  
The Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s history and text, as well as the Supreme 
Court precedent that has given meaning to its command, support the 
conclusion that by prohibiting state discrimination against out-of-state 
judgments held by individuals, the Clause confers correlative, enforceable 
rights on individuals. 
Moreover, the Court has reiterated that § 1983 must be broadly, liberally, 
and beneficently construed to ensure federal protection of constitutional 
rights.380  Permitting a § 1983 cause of action for violations of the Clause is 
consistent with the purpose of § 1983—to ―interpose‖ the federal courts to 
guard against state officers who, under the badge of state authority, deprive 
individuals of constitutionally granted rights.381  It is therefore reasonable 
to conclude that when a state official evades his constitutional obligation to 
recognize rights created by a sister-state‘s judgment, such as the parent-
child relationship created by adoption, the holder of those rights is entitled 
to bring suit in federal court. 
 
 375. See supra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 376. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 377. See supra notes 98–99, 101 and accompanying text. 
 378. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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1.  The Clause Imposes a Binding Obligation on States, 
Including State Executive Officials 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a binding constitutional duty 
on states.  By its plain language,382 a deliberate choice of the Framers,383 
the Clause is a self-executing limitation on state power.384  The Framers 
intended the Clause to transform the states from ―independent foreign 
sovereigns, each free to ignore‖ out-of-state judgments, to integral parts 
welded together through federal obligations.385  The Full Faith and Credit 
Clause eliminated a state‘s discretion to disregard the judgments of sister-
states based on its own policy preferences.386 
The Supreme Court‘s previous treatment of the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause does not control the question of whether the Clause reaches state 
officials.  The cases in which the Court stated that the Clause only 
prescribes a ―rule by which courts . . . are to be guided . . . in the progress of 
a pending suit‖387 do not limit the Clause‘s mandate to only state courts.388 
In 1904‘s Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co.,389 the Supreme Court‘s 
explanation came in response to the state‘s assertion of a Full Faith and 
Credit Clause violation in an attempt to remove its state law case to federal 
court.390  Since Minnesota asserted that a private corporation avoided 
recognition of Minnesota‘s own antitrust laws,391 it is reasonable to 
conclude that the statement referred to the Clause‘s function in a court‘s 
choice-of-law analysis.392  In this context, the Clause serves as a guiding 
rule, alongside a forum state‘s public policy considerations, in determining 
the application of sister-state laws.393  In addition, the Court‘s declaration 
that the Clause had ―nothing to do with the conduct of individuals or 
corporations‖394 is correctly understood as dismissing the state‘s contention 
that a private entity also had full faith and credit duties under the Clause‘s 
―in each state‖ language, rather than excluding individuals as beneficiaries 
of the Clause. 
Though in 1988‘s Thompson v. Thompson,395 the Supreme Court echoed 
Northern Securities‘s ―guiding rule‖ language, it responded to a plaintiff‘s 
attempt to appeal to federal courts to determine the validity of two 
 
 382. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (―Full faith and Credit shall be given in each 
State . . . .‖); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 383. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 384. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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competing state custody determinations.396  This is distinct from a claim 
alleging a state official‘s affirmative denial of full faith and credit.  
Thompson is not controlling because it addressed only a private claim 
brought against another private individual.397 
Therefore, there is no controlling Supreme Court statement as to the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause‘s reach.  Accordingly, the Clause‘s plain language 
should control, which binds state executive officials and state courts.  
Although typically invoked by litigants after a state court has refused to 
accord preclusive effect to the substance of a sister-state‘s judgment,398 the 
Clause unambiguously addresses ―states.‖399 
2.  The Right to Meaningful Recognition of Adoption 
Is Sufficiently Specific for Federal Courts to Enforce 
For litigants holding judicially created rights, the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause guarantees a right that is sufficiently specific for federal courts to 
enforce under § 1983.  In contrast to the accommodating rule applied to 
sister-state statutes,400 the Clause‘s ―exacting obligation‖ for sister-state 
judgments defines a clear right to nationwide recognition.401  Whereas the 
credit due to statutory law is subject to a somewhat vague public policy 
exception,402 the credit due to judicial rights is governed by an ―iron‖ full 
faith and credit requirement that bars exceptions.403 
The judicial sanction of adoption bestows a legal status determination of 
parent or child, and entitles the individuals who are party to an adoption to 
nationwide recognition and respect of that status.404  The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause secures recognition not only of the evidentiary validity of a 
judgment, but its substance or ―effect.‖405  The legal status of parent and 
child is therefore specific enough to merit enforcement. 
3.  The Framers Intended the Clause to Benefit Litigants 
by Ensuring Finality and Certainty 
The history and purpose of the Full Faith and Credit Clause indicate that 
the Framers intended the Clause to benefit individuals whose rights, 
statuses, and obligations were created by judgments.  By deliberately 
imposing a binding obligation on states,406 the Framers protected litigants 
from the ―accordion-like‖ predilections of states presented with sister-state 
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judgments.407  The Clause not only guarantees that judicially confirmed 
rights are preserved as litigants travel among states, but also advances the 
―maximum enforcement‖ of those rights.408 
Moreover, as the Supreme Court explained regarding the Commerce 
Clause in Dennis v. Higgins,409 the Full Faith and Credit Clause addresses 
itself to states and textually balances power among states and between the 
federal and state governments410 is not prohibitive to determining that the 
provision also confers corresponding individual rights.411  Indeed, all the 
defendants‘ unavailing arguments in Dennis regarding the Commerce 
Clause similarly fail when applied to the Full Faith and Credit Clause. 
Though the Full Faith and Credit Clause is a power-allocating provision, 
it is also a substantive limitation on a state‘s treatment of out-of-state 
judgments.412  While the Framers designed the Clause to promote national 
unity, they also intended the full faith and credit mandate to benefit 
individuals who held ―obligations created . . . by the judicial proceedings‖ 
of other states.413  Finally, though the Full Faith and Credit Clause is 
arguably subject to qualification by Congress pursuant to the Effects 
Clause,414 both the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Full Faith and Credit 
Act currently secure the maximum recognition of sister-state judgments.415 
CONCLUSION 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is a meaningful imperative for states to 
respect sister-state judgments.  Where one state has an interest in generating 
its own distinctive judgments, and another has an interest in asserting its 
own statutory policies, the Clause at times requires that a state‘s local 
policy give way to the overriding combination of federal, state, and 
individual interests.  Federalism and finality outweigh a single state‘s 
interest in its own policies. 
Even so, to balance these competing interests, the Supreme Court has 
distinguished between a state‘s obligation of recognition and enforcement 
pursuant to the Clause.  Under both standards, however, the Clause 
prohibits states from undermining the substantive rights and obligations 
sanctioned by a judgment.  A state cannot undo substantive recognition by 
reframing the application of its enforcement measures.  The framework of 
meaningful recognition best summarizes the Full Faith and Credit Clause‘s 
command.  Meaningful recognition allows for the maximum enforcement 
of judicially created rights within the Clause‘s careful balance of interests. 
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